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1 Introduction
The persistence of the gender wage gap has been the subject of much exploration in the economics
literature. It is now clear that a significant part of this gap is a direct consequence of women’s
choices, including over college major, career track, working hours, and workplace amenities. How-
ever, it is less well established whether these divergent choices result from inherent differences in
women’s preferences or abilities,1 or if they are the product of differing constraints. In this pa-
per, we test the hypothesis that women’s time-limited fertility window is a key constraint shaping
women’s career investment choices, using a large expansion of access to in vitro fertilization (IVF).
Women’s fertility begins to sharply decline in their mid-thirties, whereas men can successfully
reproduce for many years after.2 Anticipating this decline, women may cut short career investments
in order to search for a partner, marry, and have their desired number of children before the fertility
window closes. To test whether this reproductive time horizon is materially important in women’s
planning and decision-making requires variation in women’s beliefs about later-life fertility. We
know that control over fertility is important to women’s ability to invest in their careers from
literature showing that the introduction of modern contraception increased women’s education and
career outcomes (Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey, 2006, 2010). However, unlike the pill, which was
used concurrently by the women making career investments, if IVF were to affect such investments,
it would be through the anticipation of a longer time horizon for fertility while making early life
educational and career decisions. Thus, testing its impacts requires a large enough change in access
and knowledge of the technology to influence women who may only possibly need it in another 10
to 15 years. In light of this, Israel’s unprecedented decision to make IVF completely free to all
citizens in 1994 provides an ideal natural experiment.
The 1994 Israeli IVF policy change offers a unique advantage over previously studied IVF
policies, by providing an opportunity to study the impact of an exogenous, generalized shift in
beliefs about fertility horizons (rather than local changes from state-level insurance mandates as
in the United States). Key features of the Israeli policy change that allow us to identify its impact
are that it came at a time when IVF was relatively new and unknown, it was widely covered in the
Israeli press, and it can be linked to a discontinuous increase in usage. In the three years following
the policy change, live deliveries using IVF more than tripled; by 2002, 8 years after the policy
change, 1,657 IVF treatment cycles per million people were performed in Israel, compared to 126
1E.g., taste for competitiveness (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) or even distribution of intelligence (Wai et al.,
2010).
2Women lose 97% of eggs by 40 (Kelsey and Wallace, 2010), while remaining egg quality declines (Toner, 2003).
Pregnancies are rarer (Menken, Trussell and Larsen, 1986), more likely to end in miscarriage (Andersen et al., 2000),
and more likely to result in fetal abnormalities (Hook, Cross and Schreinemachers, 1983) later in life, before the
complete cessation of fecundity in menopause. While it is different to separate fecundity from fertility choices, even
prospective studies of women trying to conceive show an accelerating decline in fecundity by age 40 for women,
whereas men’s fertility is relatively stable. For example, Rothman et al. (2013) finds that women 35-40 years old will
become pregnant 77% as frequently as women age 20-24, whereas for men this ratio is 95%.
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in the United States (Collins, 2002). Thus, even without direct knowledge of the policy change,
the large amount of media attention to older women having children, and first-hand experience of
observing motherhood at older ages, could have facilitated a general shift in beliefs regarding the
time horizon of fertility.
The challenge inherent in our setting is that all Israelis were exposed to the policy change at
the same time, and thus there is no spatial or other statutory variation induced by the policy.
However, not everyone within Israel would have received the same update about their own fertility
time horizons. Naturally, men’s later life fertility and hence planning horizons were not directly
affected by IVF. In addition, Arab-Israeli women, who marry and start families at a very young
age and who had limited access to IVF due to religious restrictions, are expected to be much less
affected. These groups thus allow us to separate the specific effect of IVF on Jewish women’s time
path from general trends for others within Israel. In addition, we then present multiple robustness
checks designed to account for potential confounding factors and macroeconomic trends. Despite
its limitations, this approach to identification is called for by our research question, because some of
the most important impacts of extending reproductive time horizons may only occur when a policy
affects widespread perceptions. In other words, a policy that allowed for comparison between areas
or small groups would necessarily also have a limited impact on beliefs, and thus only be able to
address the impact of actual access to fertility extending technology, but not of a changed planning
horizon.
We hypothesize that the expectation of the option to use IVF in the future changed the per-
ceived cost of career investments to younger women, causing them to delay marriage and pursue
greater educational investments. In addition, we expect an improvement in older women’s marriage
outcomes, via a change in potential partners’ estimation of women’s fecundity horizons. Impor-
tantly, our theory of impact does not rely on the affected women actually using the technology
themselves. Rather, the future availability provides a form of insurance against age-related infertil-
ity. In this way, our work is related to literature on how life expectancy impacts financial planning
(Skinner, 1985; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009) and how health assets affect other decisions
and investments (Delavande and Kohler, 2015; Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St-Amour, 2012). A longer
time period before the loss of fertility can be seen as slowing the depreciation of “reproductive cap-
ital” (Low, 2017). We thus expect to see later age at first marriage, increased rates of education,
improvements in labor market outcomes, and improved marriage outcomes for those who marry
late.
To identify the impact on these outcomes, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach with
the 2008 Israeli population census and administrative tax data. The “treated” group is Jewish-
Israeli women born in Israel, who would have experienced a sharp change in fecundity horizons
and perceptions due to the 1994 policy change. A valid control group for the purpose of our
analysis, has to be “un-treated” by the IVF policy change while otherwise responding to similar
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forces that could potentially confound our analysis. Thus, for the analysis of marriage timing and
educational investment, we first compare Jewish-Israeli women to Jewish-Israeli men, who face
similar military requirements, a similar labor market, and the same marriage market, but whose
fertility expectations would not be impacted by the policy change.3 Supporting the use of men as a
comparison group, we show that men and women in Israel exhibited remarkably parallel trends in
age at first marriage prior to the policy change, with this outcome moving in lockstep for men and
women in the “pre” period. Therefore, although men’s decisions may be impacted in equilibrium by
women’s decisions, thus limiting our ability to interpret the magnitudes of our effect at face value,
a differential increase in women’s marriage age or education precisely in 1994 would still provide
evidence of a causal impact of fertility horizons on women’s career investments.
In addition to shocks or trends affecting Israelis as a whole, there might be some potential
confounding factors that impact particularly women. For this reason, we use as a second control
group Arab-Israeli women, who were much less likely to use IVF at the time of the policy change due
to religious restrictions, as well as less likely to be on the margin for large career investments, but
were impacted by policies and shocks affecting specifically female Israelis. For example, we know
that over the last decades there has been a broad trend, both globally and within Israel, towards
increased female education. This general trend, as well as the substantial expansion of higher
education in Israel, impacted Arab-Israeli women just as much, if not more than, Jewish-Israeli
women.
For marriage market outcomes, we can compare within Jewish women, differentiating based on
age at marriage. We compare spouses of women who got married over thirty to those who married
when they were younger, thus estimating the change in the “penalty” for older marriage in terms
of spousal quality. The treatment and comparison groups in this analysis should be impacted by
the same changes to marriage patterns over time, but younger brides do not experience the same
change in their fecundity following the change in IVF policy. Here also, the magnitude of our
estimates must be interpreted with caution, since an improvement in the marriage market for older
women would impact younger women in equilibrium. This concern is accentuated by our findings
that the policy affected marriage age and hence selection into marriage “over 30”. However, results
remain stable when we control for observable characteristics of the women.
We find striking evidence of the policy’s impact, starting with a discontinuous jump in women’s
age at first marriage. While women delayed marriage, they did not forego it entirely, but rather
shifted from marrying in their late twenties to their early thirties.4 College and graduate education
completion increased substantially for the cohorts entering these educational levels at the time of
3Although the policy also impacted treatment of male infertility via access to sperm donation, this is “primary”
rather than “secondary,” meaning age-related, infertility, and thus does not affect time horizons.
4In contrast to other developed countries, in Israel marriage rates have not been decreasing. According to the
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics report, in 2017, only 5% of cohabiting couples are un-married. A significant share
of these couples are still in their 20s, and are expected to eventually marry.
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the change. The impact on graduate education are larger than those for college, supporting our
hypothesis that the fertility constraint played an active role in these changes. These investments
paid off in terms of career outcomes, with this more educated cohort going on to have more full-time
employment, higher income, and greater participation in prestigious (high-investment) occupations.
Moreover, we find this reflected in the marriage market equilibrium, where the stark penalty as-
sociated with marrying older dissipated almost entirely following the policy change. This in turn
could have further encouraged investment.
To rule out potential alternative explanations for our findings, we employ a number of robustness
checks and placebo tests. Two particular concerns are the substantial expansion of access to higher
education in Israel over the 90s and the global trend toward greater education for women. We first
use a Quandt-Likelhood Ratio breakpoint test and event-study analysis to pin down the precise
timing of the change, showing that any alternative event would need to have an impact precisely
at 1994. Then, we use international census data to show that the change in education rates
for women in other, similar countries, including the United States, have been smooth over time,
unlike the trend break Israel exhibits. We next directly address educational expansion in Israel
by controlling for its rate, using data on the precise years of new academic colleges approval, also
allowing this expansion to have a gender-differential impact. This is in addition to the use of the
Arab control group, which should control for any factors that affected women separately from men.
We also show there was no similar gender-differential increase in high school completion or the
taking of matriculation exams, “Bagrut,” which is a decision less likely to be affected by fertility
planning. Finally, we use the 1995 Israeli Census to perform a placebo test, demonstrating that
the structural breaks we show in the data are unprecedented historically, and use a permutation
analysis to demonstrate that our effects are uniquely empirically large.
Together, our findings indicate that mitigating women’s concerns for age-related infertility alters
women’s educational and marriage decisions, leading to better career outcomes. This bolsters the
theory that fertility time horizon are an important factor in women’s family and career decisions.
More broadly, this research stresses the role of biological differences in divergence of economic
outcomes, and thus the potential role of policies in blunting this effect. Such policies would not
necessarily need to focus on fertility extending technology alone, but could rather aim to relieve the
stark career-childbearing tradeoff, thus making the fertility time horizon less salient to investments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses prior literature; Section 3
describes the empirical setting for our project and the data we use; Section 4 presents results and
tests their robustness, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
Numerous papers document and aim to explain the evolution of the gender pay gap and its per-
sistence over the last two decades in the US and in other developed economies.5 A significant
part of the lack of convergence between genders is attributed to human capital factors, including
choices of college majors (Zafar, 2013; Bronson, 2015), entry into different professions and indus-
tries (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Goldin, 2014; Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek, 2014), and
cumulative labor force experience, driven by part time work and time out of the labor force (O’Neill
and Polachek, 1993).
Previous literature establishes that control over fertility plays an important role in women’s
career choices. Generally, this control can be divided into two types: for young women, control
over fertility means being able to avoid unwanted pregnancies; however for older women, in their
late thirties and forties, control over fertility means actually being able to conceive and give birth
when they want to. While there is a vast body of empirical evidence on how “too much” fertility
affects women’s educational, career and marital prospects, the impact of “too little” fertility has
not been sufficiently explored.
Goldin and Katz (2002) (and later Bailey (2006, 2010)) use the expansion of access to oral
contraception to demonstrate that the ability to delay motherhood enabled women to make greater
educational and labor market investments. Numerous additional studies support these findings,
and use various methods to establish and quantify the tradeoff between family and career for
women (Loughran and Zissimopoulos, 2009; Buckles, 2008; Blackburn, Bloom and Neumark, 1993;
Taniguchi, 1999; Gustafsson, 2003; Miller, 2011; Avellar and Smock, 2003; Wilde, Batchelder and
Ellwood, 2010). Additional recent work connects raising children to substantial wage declines for
women (Adda, Dustmann and Stevens, 2017; Kleven, Landais and Sogaard, 2016).
On the other hand, women who choose to delay fertility in favor of career investments risk not
achieving their desired family size. In addition to individual utility consequences of potentially
lower fertility, women who marry when older may experience difficulties on the marriage market,
since fecundity may be a trait that potential spouses value (Siow, 1998; Dessy and Djebbari, 2010;
Bronson and Mazzocco, 2015). Díaz-Giménez and Giolito (2013) demonstrate that the gender
difference in fecundity horizons can account for patterns of the spousal age gap, and hence that
fecundity is fundamentally important in explaining the timing of marriage, even for young people.
Low (2017) presents direct evidence on the impact of fertility on marriage markets, using an online
experiment to demonstrate that when age is randomly assigned to dating profiles, men, but not
women, prefer younger partners. This effect is especially driven by men who have no children of their
own and have accurate knowledge of the age-fertility relationship for women. An accompanying
5See Blau and Kahn (2017) for updated evidence on the US and an extensive discussion and review on the possible
sources of the phenomenon.
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theoretical model shows that increasing women’s expected fertility will increase career investment
and improve marriage matches for women who choose to invest.
This literature suggests that technology alleviating the problem of age-related infertility could
increase women’s educational investment and improve marriage outcomes for women who do invest.
However, the research on assisted reproduction technology (ART) has, to date, mainly focused on
outcomes of women who actually use the technology, rather than younger women who perceive it
as offering insurance for infertility later in life. A series of papers uses the variation in mandated
insurance coverage of ART (including IVF) across US states and over time to determine how more
coverage affects IVF usage and outcomes (Velez et al., 2014; Hamilton and McManus, 2012; Bitler
and Schmidt, 2012, 2006; Bundorf, Henne and Baker, 2007; Buckles, 2013; Schmidt, 2007, 2005),
providing evidence that when coverage goes up, more women use IVF, fertility rates for older
mothers go up, and multiple births rise.
A much more limited literature uses the same state-year variation to explore the impact on the
timing of marriage and childbearing, supporting the hypothesis that access to infertility treatments
(that will primarily be helpful later in life) may influence the decisions of younger women. Ohinata
(2011) finds that infertility insurance mandates resulted in 1-2 year delays in first birth among highly
educated white women, and Abramowitz (2012, 2014) shows that increased access is associated with
marriage and childbearing delays for white women. The only evidence on career outcomes comes
from Buckles (2007), which finds suggestive evidence that infertility insurance mandates led to
increased labor force participation for women.
The approach of using state-year variation in IVF coverage mandates has limitations, especially
when discussing general equilibrium shifts in perceptions of both men and women. Since these
are small and localized policy changes, awareness may not be widespread, particularly with young
women who may not even be managing their own insurance yet. Due to the gradual and moderate
increase in IVF usage, it is not clear if knowledge about the change could reach the young population
by observation. Additionally, there is mixed evidence on how state health insurance mandates
influence the insurance and labor market equilibrium: mandates may increase insurance premiums
more significantly for the most affected workers and therefore negatively affect their wages and
employment (Lahey, 2012).6 Nonetheless, these papers find effects even with this more limited
variation, and thus suggest an important potential contribution in testing the hypothesis that
access to IVF may affect women’s early-life decisions using a more discrete policy event.
The Israeli policy change thus provides a unique opportunity, in applying equally to all, and
being widely discussed publicly. Moreover, given that the coverage is publicly funded, there are no
concerns that the observed changes in women’s career investment are driven by a shift in employers’
6With any employer-provided insurance benefit, wages may fall to reflect the presence of the benefit to employees,
and cost to employers. Lahey (2012) presents evidence on infertility mandates suggesting that in addition to these
falling wages, because wage changes will not fully offset the increased premium costs for women in affected age groups,
employment opportunities (and thus labor force participation) for this group decreases.
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costs and preferences for employing older women.
Our paper is the first to study a large-scale policy change that changed not just the actual
chance of getting pregnant when older, but, crucially, the beliefs about this chance by both young
women considering career investments and their potential marriage partners. Moreover, this is the
first paper to empirically study the impacts of a shift in later-life fertility potential on outcomes
resulting from the decision to delay childbearing, including educational investments and marriage
match quality.
3 Setting and Empirical Approach
3.1 IVF in Israel
Since the emergence of IVF technology in the early 80s, Israel has been on the forefront of IVF
research: the first Israeli “test tube baby,” born in 1982, was only the fifth IVF birth worldwide.
However, until the early nineties, usage of the technology was still relatively low, and technological
advances were slow in coming. IVF treatments were covered at least to some extent by Israel’s four
main health plans,7 but in practice, most couples had to pay substantial fees to access services.8
The extent of coverage and terms of eligibility varied between health plans and, in many cases,
were vague or a priori undetermined.9
Following a widely covered, public debate, the Knesset enacted the 1994 National Health In-
surance Law (NHI), which included IVF tests and treatments in a “basket” of free health services
that all health plans must provide. The law provides all Israeli citizens with guaranteed access to:
“IVF treatments for the purpose of the birth of two children for couples who do not
have children from their present marriage, as well as for childless women who wish to
establish a single-parent family.”
The law, as originally written, did not place any restrictions on the age of women, or the number
of attempts that could be made, and provided coverage for up to two “take-home babies.” This
is in stark contrast to most IVF coverage policies, which usually entitles beneficiaries to a certain
number of treatments, rather than a certain outcome. The 1994 law thus provided access to IVF
7The four health plans were partially subsidized by the government, but mostly relied on the membership fees
they collected. Approximately 5% of the population, had no health insurance at all.
8See, for example “We will have to forgo having a child since we cannot afford fertility treatments,” Yedioth
Ahronoth, June 14, 1992, which tells the story of a couple who could not afford treatment because, although ostensibly
covered by their health plan, the hospital required they pay 2,000 Israeli Shekels as a “donation.”
9The most generous coverage was offered by the largest health plan (“Clalit”), which placed almost no limitations
on usage, but due to difficulty tracking treatments, rather than official policy (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2004). The other
health plans offered a limited number of treatment cycles and placed age restrictions on use, as well as requiring
long qualification periods. For example in the “Leumit” health plan the number of treatment cycles was limited to
six and the maximal age was 40. Membership in health plans was mostly based on political affiliation and parents’
membership, and switching between them was very difficult.
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that is unmatched anywhere in the world, ushering in an era of expanded usage and technological
improvement.
Importantly, the passing of the law was driven by a pro-natalist agenda, rooted in the Jewish
tradition of familism, rather than pro-woman or “feminist” impulses which may have carried other
effects.10 As an example of the policy objectives behind the law, Israel’s supreme court ruled (during
numerous debates over the implications of the policy) that becoming a parent is a fundamental
human right.11
The new and unique Israeli funding policy facilitated fast adoption and increased usage of
fertility-enhancing technologies. Figure 1 shows that the number of IVF treatment cycles (both
total and relative to the population of fertile women) more than doubled in the 6 years following
the approval of the new policy.12 Although the benefits of the law came into effect in 1995, the
increase in the number of IVF treatment cycles began already in 1994, with the large amount of
press coverage and increased knowledge of IVF availability. The figure on the right hand side shows
that in the year after usage increased, there was a sharp increase in live deliveries using IVF.13
Figure 1: Direct Impacts of IVF Access
(a) IVF Treatment Cycles (b) IVF Deliveries with Live Births
Notes: Administrative data from Israeli Ministry of Health, covering all women in Israel.
Figure 2 shows the direct impact on older women’s fertility, by measuring the increase in women
10Other examples of such policies are governmental child allowances and maternity grants, broad legal protection
of working mothers’ rights, extended funding of prenatal care and various tax benefits for parents. For a thorough
discussion of those policies and their evolvement over time, see Birenbaum-Carmeli (2003).
11See High Court 7052/03 Adalla vs. Ministry of Interior.
12The Israeli parliament “Kneset” issued a report in 2012 that attributes this dramatic change to the regularization
and expansion of IVF funding under the NHI law.
13The common measure of usage is the number of IVF treatment cycles relative to the size of fertile women
population. Since there is no documentation of the number of women treated each year, it is impossible to assess
whether the sharp increase in usage stems from an increase in the number of women undergoing IVF treatments, or
from an increase in the number of attempts each IVF patient makes. It is reasonable to assume that it is a result of
a combination of these two, especially given the large increase in IVF-assisted births.
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over 40 (a significant portion of whom would require fertility technology of some kind to be able to
conceive) with children under one year old. The data for this figure is from the Israeli Annual Labor
Force Survey (LFS). This graph shows a large increase in older motherhood in 1995, immediately
after women dramatically increased usage of IVF technology. This immediate change, amounting
to more than 30% of the initial level of older motherhood,14 persisted and kept expanding rapidly
in the years that followed.
Figure 2: Percentage of Women over 40 with Children ≤1 year, Labor Force Survey
Notes: The figure presents the percentage of women above age 40 (>40 and <=47, since in practice very few women
above 47 have young children) with children of age 1 or below. Data from the Israeli Annual Labor Force Survey
1984-2004, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
As a result of this shift, the media was flooded with IVF success stories, such as extreme cases
of women having children at advanced ages, further raising awareness of the new technology.15 In
the Israeli press, local success stories were celebrated as “national accomplishments and symbols of
local scientific excellence” (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2004). The IVF law itself was also heavily covered
in the press, and continued to be covered as debates ensued on whether to limit coverage.16 Both
1994 and 1995 saw a spike in newspaper coverage of IVF and funding issues surrounding it.17
14We refer to 1993 as the pre-change reference since 1994 may have already been partially impacted
15For example, “World record: woman aged 60 gave birth to girl,” Yedioth Ahronoth, February 22, 1994. (After 44
failed test-tube fertilizations, a 60-year-old woman gave birth to a baby girl in 1994.)
16The Ministry of Health expressed its intent to limit coverage to seven treatment cycles and provoked public
protest. The press covered this conflict using personal stories of women over 40 that had children only following
dozens of IVF treatment cycles and others who are still trying after a number of failures (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2004).
17Based on a news search of Israel’s leading Hebrew newspaper, 1994-1995 the largest number of articles on fertility,
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Advocates of the health reform, including the minister of health, publicly touted the benefits of
IVF funding in interviews as a reason to support the policy change.18
In the years following the policy change, there was expanding access to IVF services, and a
standardization of practices surrounding IVF and its funding.19 Nowadays, there are 26 IVF clinics
spread throughout Israel, making treatment very easily accessible for most residents of Israel. Israel
has become the world leader in the rate of IVF treatment cycles and in the percentage of babies
born following IVF treatments: approximately 4% of all babies born in Israel are conceived using
IVF (Hashiloni-Dolev, 2013).20 Meanwhile, IVF technology was steadily improving during this
period, increasing success rates and the range of fertility problems that could be treated. The three
forces of improved access, technological improvement, and publicity reinforced each other, driving
a rapid and ongoing change in Israelis’ attitudes and perceptions regarding IVF success rates, and
thus the fertility time horizons for women.
Hashiloni-Dolev, Kaplan and Shkedi-Rafid (2011) surveyed Israeli undergraduates, both male
and female, in 2009 about their perceptions of natural fertility and IVF success. Table 1 presents
an estimated comparison between perceived natural fertility versus IVF-enabled fertility for women
of different ages, constructed using these survey responses.21 The survey responses show, first, that
college-aged men and women were aware of the natural decline in fertility with age, although they
somewhat over-estimated older-age success rates.22 Next, it shows that not only were college-age
students aware of IVF technology, they, if anything, believed it to be much more effective than
true medical rates.23 Students believed that the addition of IVF technology made 36-39 year-old
mothers as fertile as those age 20-35, demonstrating the belief that IVF allowed a substantial
delay in fertility commencement. Moreover, the students estimated that IVF created a substantial
improvement in fertility in each age range. This data allows us to approximate the extent to which
young women’s expected fertility increased following the introduction of IVF.
including success stories, reports about the law and the arrangements surrounding it (e.g. how to fund treatments
for couples with different HMOs)
18See for example an interview with the minister of health Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Yedioth Ahronoth, December 15,
1994.
19The most distinct example is the 1996 Embryonic Carrying Agreement Law, officially legalizing and regulating
surrogacy for the first time in the world (Simonstein, 2010).
20Compared to approximately 1-2% of the children born in other countries where IVF use is prevalent. The annual
number of IVF cycles per million persons in Israel is the highest in the world and amounts to almost 3,500, compared
to 2,000 in Denmark, which is second (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2010).
21The survey did not ask about the same age ranges for natural fertility versus IVF success. Thus, we fit a flexible
polynomial to the responses for natural fertility to construct estimates of the perceived natural fertility for the same
age ranges for which students were asked about IVF success. We then assumed that IVF was to be used in the case
natural conception was unsuccessful, so added the potential additional IVF success (IVF success rate multiplied by
the chance of natural conception failure) to the natural conception rate. There is no similar study conducted in Israel
prior to 1994.
22Note that the over-estimation of natural fertility rates could also be attributed to increased availability of ARTs,
because while older-age pregnancies are observable, the usage of fertility extending technology is not.
23For example, students believed that IVF would be 32% effective for women 40-43, whereas the true rate is around
20% (Hashiloni-Dolev, Kaplan and Shkedi-Rafid, 2011).
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Table 1: Beliefs of Israeli Students about IVF Success Rates, 2009
Woman’s Natural fertility Success rate Improvement
age success rate with IVF from IVF
% % %
20-35 74.6 90.8 21.7
36-39 58.1 75.9 30.5
40-43 46.9 63.9 36.3
44-47 36.8 52.8 43.2
48-52 28.4 41.5 45.8
53-58 17.6 29.5 67.4
Notes: Imputed estimates from Hashiloni-Dolev, Kaplan and Shkedi-
Rafid (2011) survey of Israeli male and female college students. Es-
timates for natural fertility success rates for given age ranges created
by fitting a fifth-order polynomial to survey responses, which were for
different age ranges. Total success rates computed by multiplying IVF
success rates from the survey by the natural fertility failure rate, then
adding to the natural fertility success rate. Percent improvement is the
success attributed to IVF divided by baseline success.
3.2 Empirical Approach and Data
We examine the impact of knowledge of IVF access on timing of marriage, higher education attain-
ment (both college and graduate), career outcomes, and spousal quality for women who marry when
older. The impact of increased access to fertility extending technologies could be expected to be
particularly salient to Israelis, who tend to marry 3 years younger and have 1.5 more children than
in other OECD countries. Moreover, as Israelis tend to complete education 2.5 years later than in
these countries, due to mandatory military service, even early educational and career investments,
such as completing college, may infringe on a woman’s planned reproductive years, and potentially
limit family size.24 This makes Israel an ideal setting for the study of the impact of extended
reproductive time horizons offered by IVF technology on women’s decisions and outcomes.
As previously mentioned, the 1994 Israeli IVF policy applied to all Israeli citizens. This provides
the advantage of potentially shifting widespread beliefs about reproductive time horizons, but the
disadvantage of not providing statutory variation for identification. We thus employ a difference-
in-differences strategy, comparing groups which are expected to be more versus less affected by the
policy, within the country. We use multiple control groups and a number of robustness and placebo
checks to present a collage of evidence that the policy indeed causally impacted the outcomes we
examine.
Our data comes from the 2008 Israeli population census, covering approximately 20% of Israeli
24These estimated differences are based on UN, OECD and Israeli CBS data and reports.
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households.25 This data is combined with administrative tax data, to accurately measure income.
Our analysis is restricted to native born Israelis, to avoid potential bias from substantial immigrant
inflows over time, including the mass migration from the former USSR during the late 80s and
early 90s. Our “treated” group is Jewish-Israeli women, who are most likely to be responsive to a
change in IVF access. When we choose the appropriate comparison groups, we rely on the fact that
different population groups responded differently to the introduction of IVF(Remennick, 2010), in
addition to having significantly different gender and family norms (Danziger and Neuman, 1999).
Religion plays a significant role in these differences, and while Judaism allows essentially all ART
practices, the Roman Catholic church completely bans them and Islam places significant restrictions
on use (especially on surrogacy and egg and sperm donations (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2003)). We use
Jewish men, Arab women, and young Jewish women as comparison groups for various parts of our
analysis.
We use Jewish men to absorb changes that could have affected the overall marriage and edu-
cational market for Jewish Israelis, such as changing life expectancies, economic shifts or changes
in labor demand, and demographic change. Given that men do not experience the same drop in
fertility with age as women, IVF funding is unlikely to affect their expectations for age-related
levels of fecundity.26 They may, however, be affected in equilibrium by shifts in women’s choices
(e.g., for marriage age, having to search for a new partner if women choose to delay), but these
effects would not exceed the initial impact on women. This does mean, however, that our effect
should be considered a lower bound on the true impact.
We use Arab women to absorb changes that could have affected specifically women in Israel,
distinctly from men. One important example is an ongoing reform in Israel that increased access
to higher education, especially for disadvantaged populations in peripheral areas. This reform
might impact women differentially, for example, if the cost of moving away from home to acquire
education is more costly for women than for men, or if it helped remove cultural barriers to women’s
education. If so, though, Arab women would have certainly been impacted by this change. On
the other hand, Arab-Israeli women make a suitable control group first and foremost because they
are much less likely to use IVF, due to stronger religious restrictions on its use. Secondly, Arab
women were at the time much less likely to be on the margin for time-costly career investments, due
to lower baseline education levels and younger age at first marriage (although trends in marriage
age were parallel).27 Additionally, Arab women begin college on average 3-4 years younger than
25The survey began at the end of 2008 and was concluded in July 2009.
26Similarly to how in Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009), women’s life expectancy was updated by declines in
maternal mortality, while men’s was unaffected.
27According to annual data published by the Israeli central bureau of statistics, at 1993 (just before the policy
change) the median age at first marriage for Arab-Muslim Israeli women was 20 compared to 23.3 for Jewish Israeli
women (average age was 21.1 compared to 24). Total fertility rates for Arab Israelis were also higher, at 4.5-4.7
births per women, compared to slightly below 3 for Jewish-Israeli women (as reported in CBS working paper no. 60,
Fertility among Jewish and Muslim Women in Israel, by Ahmad Hleihel).
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Jewish women, since they do not serve in the military, creating a lower concern for the impact of
college education on fertility.28 While this strategy may have its own potential confounding factors,
they should be orthogonal to any issues presented by the male control group. Thus, if we estimate
similar effects using the two strategies, it is unlikely that they are both caused by a single omitted
factor.
In addition to these main control groups, we also employ other control groups and tactics to
help identify the impact of the policy. For the analysis on how older women’s spousal quality
changes following the policy change, we are able to use younger women as a control group, since
women who marry younger would have their anticipated fertility largely unchanged by the new
technology. To account for the potential that broader international trends, such as the global trend
in women seeking more education, are responsible for our results, we do placebo analyses in several
other countries. To verify that censoring due to the retrospective nature of the data does not bias
the results, we compare our main findings to a placebo analysis using the exact same techniques
in the 1995 Census, looking at the period prior to the true policy change. All of these exercises
confirm that our effect is unique and empirically large.
We begin our analysis by looking at age at first marriage, by year of marriage, over a 30-year
study period, from 1979 to 2008. We consider 1994 to be the first year of the treatment period, as
our treatment is knowledge of IVF availability in the future and the resulting change of expectations,
rather than the actual funding change. We first use men as the “less affected” comparison group.
Using this group to identify the causal impact of interest requires men and women’s average age at
first marriage to respond similarly to any changes in the environment except for the introduction
of IVF. To assess the plausibility of this assumption, we plot the pre-period trends of age at first
marriage for men and women separately. Figure 3 shows that men and women had strikingly
parallel trends in age at first marriage during the pre-period, moving in lock-step and responding
to common shocks. This may be partially attributable to the largely “closed” marriage market
of Israeli-born Jews—immigrants and other ethnic groups tend to marry within their own groups.
One limitation of the tight relationship between male and female age at first marriage, is that if
women suddenly decided to delay marriage, it may create an “echo” effect on men’s outcomes.This
would make the estimated effect using this control strategy a lower bound on the true impact;
however, this effect could not cause us to find an effect where none exists.
We first estimate a basic difference-in-differences specification, that measures the average change
in the female-male difference in age at first marriage (AFM), between the “pre” and “post” periods,
28See for example CBS report “Arabs in Higher Education in Israel - First Year Students for First Degree in
2011/12” issued October 21st 2014. It should also be noted that the variance of the age of college applicants is
much larger for the Jewish population (based on CBS data processed and presented by Mr. Aviel Kranzler, Higher
Education and Science department at the CBS.)
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Figure 3: Female vs. Male Age at First Marriage – Pre-period
Notes: Figure shows average age at first marriage for women and men, by year of marriage, for the years prior to the
policy change. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
according to the following equation:
AFMi = β0 + β1femi + β2posti + β3femi × posti + β4timei +X ′iγ + ui
where X is a vector of individual level controls, which includes indicators for religiosity (ultra-
orthodox or not) and parents’ origin (Europe and America, Asia and Africa, or Israeli born), to
account for demographic shifts over time, fem is a dummy for female, post is a dummy for marriage
years 1994 and onwards, and timei is a linear time trend. We then test for both a change in levels
at the time of the policy change and a change in the time-trend of the outcome variable, allowing
us to examine the evolution of the effect over time:
AFMi = β0 + β1femi + β2posti + β3femi × posti + β4timei
+ β5posti × timei + β6femi × timei + β7femi × posti × timei +X ′iγ + ui
We repeat the estimation of both equations adding year of marriage fixed-effects, to more flexibly
control for time trends and account for transitory shocks that may affect the marriage market. We
present the same estimation with the Arab women control in the appendix.
To study how the distribution of age at first marriage changed, we run a series of regressions
using indicators for being married by a given age as the outcome variable, with the same specifica-
tion. We expect to find that the shift in average age is driven by women in their mid to late twenties
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postponing marriage, rather than women who marry very young, who should not be affected by
fecundity concerns. This also allows us to examine the extensive margin of marriage, by looking at
those who “ever married” by their forties.
We then turn to examining the impact of the policy on education, first comparing women’s
outcomes to those of men.29 Given that our data is from a single 2008 cross-section, we identify as
treated in this case those from cohorts that were still at the relevant age for educational decisions
at the time they learned about the increased access to IVF. As our main specification, we use the
median age of applicants (as reported in macro data) to determine the first treated cohort. We use
a data range from the 1951 cohort to the 1977 cohort, for college education, and the 1974 cohort
for graduate education, to avoid censoring.30
Since there is a slight upward trend in women’s college education relative to men’s pre-treatment,
we control for a gender-specific linear time trends in the standard DID specification, and estimate
the following equation:
Educationi = β0 + β1femi + β2posti + β3femi × posti + β4timei + β5femi × timei +X ′iγ + ui
where Education is an indicator for having a college degree (Bachelor’s degree) or a graduate degree,
post indicates cohorts young enough to enter college or graduate school after the policy change and
time allows for a linear trend over cohorts (also interacted with fem to account for gender specific
pre-trends) . In addition, we estimate a specification which allows for changes both in level and
trend (as with age at first marriage) and add year of birth fixed effects to both specifications.
We then re-estimate this section using Arab women as the control group, to account for any
possible changes in women’s access to or demand for education over the same time period. We also
examine this outcome in repeated cross-section data, the Israeli Labor Force Survey, and conduct
a placebo test on high school completion.
Finally, we examine the impacts of the policy on marriage market outcomes for older women,
measured by spousal quality. We compare women who marry between 30 and 34 to those who
marry between 25 and 29. We place the cutoff between the two groups at 30 to exploit the
perceived discontinuity in expected fertility exhibited at this age. Following the IVF policy change,
the group of “older” brides (and their potential spouses) may expect greater fecundity following the
policy change, while the marital fecundity of the “younger” brides remains essentially unchanged.
We measure the impact of this difference over year of marriage, expecting to observe a lag in this
29It should be noted that just as with age at first marriage, men’s education levels may be affected in general
equilibrium (e.g., if partner education is complementary in marital surplus, and so more educated women leads to
more educated men), but should be affected much less than women.
301951 is chosen as the beginning of the range because it is the first cohort to have a reasonable number of
observations for Israeli-born Jews (the state of Israel was founded in 1948). The end of our data range is chosen to
avoid censoring in educational outcomes among individuals who may not have completed their education by the time
of the 2008 Census, thus we analyze individuals no younger than 31 years old for college education and individuals
no younger than 34 years old for graduate education.
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outcome’s response to the policy change, since reaching a new equilibrium in the marriage market
takes time. Nevertheless, we use 1994, the year of the new policy introduction, as the first year in
the post-treatment period.
The main measure we use for spousal quality is income. Since our data is cross-sectional, we
use several methods to alleviate concerns for bias due to comparing spouses of different ages. First,
the restriction of brides’ age range (25-34) also places some bounds on grooms’ age range. Second,
in all the specifications for this outcome, we control for the age of the spouse, using a flexible
polynomial in age (in the appendix, we show that results hold when we alternatively control for
spousal year-of-birth fixed effects or use income-for-age percentiles as the outcome). Third, we
use additional measures of spousal quality which are less sensitive to age, e.g., level of education
and occupation. Last, we restrict our sample period to 18 years between 1986-2003, in order to
avoid measuring income of students or retirees. This range of years was determined based on men’s
full-time employment patterns over age together with the distribution of their age at marriage.
Due to this restriction and to the expected lag in the development of the new marriage market
equilibrium, we have too few post-treatment periods to identify a change in trend and thus focus
on a difference-in-differences analysis for levels only:
Spouse_inci = β0 + β1olderi + β2posti + β3olderi × posti + β4timei +X ′iγ + ui
Here, post indicates marriage years 1994 and onwards and the demographic controls contained in
X address characteristics of the bride (although the outcome measure is for the groom), in addition
to controlling for a fifth degree polynomial function of spousal age, to account for the cross-sectional
nature of the data. In the appendix we present results for specifications with additional controls.
For this outcome, we can also use men as a second control group in a triple-differences specifi-
cation:
Spouse_inci = β0 + β1olderi + β2posti + β3olderi × posti
+ β4femi + β5olderi × femi + β6posti × femi + β7olderi × posti × femi +X ′iγ + ui
The coefficient of interest here is β7 which can be interpreted as the change in spousal quality for
“older” brides relative to younger brides, compared to those same differences in spousal quality
for grooms marrying over this time period. This helps determine that the evolution we observe is
driven by a female specific change, and not by some general shift for older marriages. However,
the quantitative results of this estimation should be interpreted cautiously, since we are observing
a shift in equilibrium which will also impact men’s outcomes.
For all of the outcomes and specifications described above, we use two alternative methods to
calculate standard errors. The first method, has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional
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correlation in outcomes as we cluster at the year × group level. Our second set of standard errors
aims to deal with potential serial correlation in the outcome variables, which could lead to over-
rejection of the null hypothesis in a DiD framework (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). We
divide our sample into sub-groups, based on the standard classification of Israel into 51 “natural
regions” and cluster at the geography × group level (examples of similar sub-group clustering can
be found in Agarwal et al. (2014), clustering at the product level, and Hanlon (2015), clustering at
the patent level). Since the regions are defined to be as homogenous as possible, both in terms of
geographical characteristics and in terms of demographic and economic traits of their population,
we expect any shocks related to women’s access to education or health services to occur within
these regions. Moreover, structural shifts in labor and marriage markets, which directly affect our
outcomes of interest, are likely to have significant regional components.
To further address the concern for serial correlation, we then re-estimate our main specification
for each outcome with an explicit AR(1) error structure, by collapsing our data into year-group
cells and estimating via Generalized Least Squares (GLS), allowing for correlation both across and
within panels (as in Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2010)). The within-panel correlation factor
accounts for serial correlation, assuming an AR(1) process with a unique autocorrelation parameter
for each panel (i.e., gender). Finally, in the appendix, we show permutation tests for each of our
main results, demonstrating that our effects are “large” relative to the actual variation present in
the data.
Because there may have been other long-term societal trends that could have divergent effects
for men and women, we perform several analyses to provide further evidence that the 1994 IVF
policy change drives our results. First, we use a Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) test31 to search
over all possible break dates, and show that our “treatment year” is indeed identified as the break
among candidate dates. Second, we use event study graphs, charting the impact over time around
the time of the policy change, to show that a pre-trend is not driving our results, but rather that the
observed effects only become significant after the policy change. We additionally present a variety
of placebo tests, discussed above, as well as a number of robustness checks to control for possible
omitted factors. Finally, we rely on the specific combination of outcome variables to bolster the
evidence that IVF access is the driver behind the changes. While there are a few other mechanisms
that may have an effect on one of the outcomes we study, none of those can be expected to impact
both women’s educational and marriage decisions and marriage outcomes for older women. We
review candidate alternative explanations in more detail in section 4.4.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for our sample, comparing Jewish women to Jewish men (our
main comparison) as well as Arab women, and then women who marry while young (25-29) to
those who marry older (30-34). In addition to showing means for our key outcomes and controls,
Table 2 also compares pre-trends in outcomes for the different groups. As mentioned above, our
31See Andrews (1993).
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specifications control for group-specific trends when needed.
4 Results
4.1 Marriage Timing
The first outcome we examine is women’s marriage timing. We hypothesize that when women
feel more certain about their reproductive prospects later in life, they are more willing to delay
marriage, which could in turn allow greater career investments. In contrast to the other outcomes
we consider, the decision to delay marriage is completely controlled by the individual and does
not require meeting certain standards or going through some process, such as being accepted to a
university. It also does not require the consent of a potential partner or any update to men’s beliefs,
as would be the case for the choice of spouse, for example.32 This should enable us to identify a
clean and immediate effect precisely at the year when the policy was introduced. Note that even
women unaware of the policy change itself may have altered their marriage decisions due to updated
beliefs about later life fertility, as knowledge of IVF swiftly spread through media coverage of the
policy and related success stories. This increased sense of control over later life fertility both
increased expected utility from delayed childbearing while potentially alleviating concerns about
being penalized on the marriage market for delaying marriage, as potential spouses also value higher
fecundity. Both would increase the willingness to delay marriage.
For this part of the analysis, time represents the year the marriages are taking place, and thus,
the treatment year is 1994, the year of the policy change. Figure 4 clearly shows that pre-trends
for men and women were parallel, in the lefthand figure that graphs outcomes separately (with age
at first marriage de-meaned), implying that women’s marriage age was practically constant relative
to men’s until 1994. Men and women’s age at first marriage also appears to respond to common
shocks in the pre-period. Starting in 1994, women’s marriage age increases discontinuosly relative
to men.33 The graph of the difference in outcomes shows a sharp increase in level immediately at
1994, followed by a substantial positive change in trend. This striking discontinuity in age at first
marriage is unprecedented, is unique amongst other countries, and has no clear explanation other
than the introduction of free IVF.
Table 3 analyzes this change using a regression, in both a simple DiD framework (columns 1
and 2), and an analysis demonstrating the change both in level and trend (columns 3 and 4). The
latter indicates an increasing change in the outcome over time, which correlates with the gradual
change in perceptions, rather than just a one-time jump. We find that women’s age at marriage
32It should also be noted that in Israel, couples tend to marry very soon after becoming engaged, and so there is
not an extensive “lag” between the decision to get married and marriage itself.
33Although men’s age at first marriage appears to decline in this year, in all previous shocks, men’s and women’s
outcomes have responded in tandem. Thus, relative to the common shock, women’s age increases.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Jewish women Jewish men Arab women
Marrying pre-1994: N=38,370 N=33,949 N=14,901
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Ultra-Orthodox 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 N/A N/A
European-born mother 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 N/A N/A
Asian/African-born mother 0.54 0.50 0.52 0.50 N/A N/A
Income (Shekels) 95,629 92,393 186,757 173,543 53,299 49,999
Age 44.81 5.39 47.46 5.34 42.24 5.66
Age at first marriage 23.15 3.91 25.86 3.86 21.03 4.11
AFM pre-trend (SE) 0.13 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.08 (0.01)
College age pre-1994: N=61,000 N=58,704 N=22,278
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
College Educated 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.08 0.27
College pre-trend (SE) 0.0057 (0.00) 0.0041 (0.00) 0.0035 (0.00)
Grad-school age pre-1994: N=46,428 N=44,355 N=16,449
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Highly Educated 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.10
Highly Ed. pre-trend (SE) 0.0009 (0.00) 0.0008 (0.00) 0.0033 (0.00)
Married 30-34 Married 25-29
Marrying pre-1994: N=3,549 N=11,227
Mean SD Mean SD
Ultra-Orthodox 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
European-born mother 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43
Asia/African-born mother 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
Income (Shekels) 92,324 89,096 99,632 96,644
Spousal Income 166,626 170,094 192,747 181,682
Sp. Income pre-trend (SE) -1494 (1,734) 504 (954)
Notes: 2008 Israeli population census (20% sample). Restricted to Israeli-born. Sample “marrying pre-
1994” is those married 1979 - 1993, inclusive. “College age pre-1993” is those born 1951 - 1970 for Jewish
population, and 1954 - 1973 for Arab population. “Grad-school age pre-1994” is those born 1951 - 1966
for Jewish population, 1954 - 1969 for Arab population. Table by marriage age uses sample of women
married 1986 - 1993 (shorter range due to income censoring for older individuals) with spousal matches
in 2008 census.
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Figure 4: Female vs. Male Age at First Marriage
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows average age at first marriage for women and men, by year of marriage, de-meaned so that the
relative changes can be seen more clearly. Figure (b) presents the difference in average age at first marriage between
women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre (1979-1993) and post (1994-2008) periods. Data from the 2008
Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
jumps by three months, relative to men, immediately following the policy change, and continues
steadily increasing thereafter. Both the discontinuity as well as the slope change are significant,
although at a lower level under the geographically clustered standard errors. Columns 5 and 6
show the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) specification, where data is collapsed to year-group
cells, for the DiD with slopes. As mentioned above, the standard errors are adjusted to account for
cross-sectional correlation and serial correlation, assuming a panel-specific AR(1) process. Once
again, both the intercept change and slope change at 1994 are significant, and of similar magnitude
to the OLS estimates. Note, these large effects were most likely caused by some women delaying
substantially (perhaps to pursue education), and others being unaffected.
To understand how the distribution of marriage age was affected, rather than just the average,
we run a series of regressions using the column 3 specification, but replacing the outcome variable
with an indicator for being married by a certain age. Figure 5 shows the point estimates and
confidence intervals for the two coefficients of interest on the interaction terms fem×post and
fem×post×time, for each age cutoff. Figure 5(a) presents estimates for the immediate change in
level (i.e. change in the percentage of women married by the specified age) and figure 5(b) shows
the estimated change in trend. The two graphs show no decrease in marrying by age 22, which
provides a useful falsification test, since we would not expect women inclined to marry and begin
childbearing by age 22 to be concerned about fertility in their late thirties, and hence to be affected
by access to IVF. We see the largest reduction in marriage by age 26, and from there a steadily
decreasing impact, until the total effect reaches zero at age 38. Importantly, the lack of reduction
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Table 3: Age at First Marriage
Dependent variable: Age at First Marriage
DiD Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.412 0.415 0.241 0.246 0.247 0.195
(0.073)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.127)∗ (0.044)∗∗∗ (0.082)∗∗∗ (0.058)∗∗∗
[0.221]∗ [0.220]∗ [0.135]∗ [0.133]∗
fem × post × time 0.039 0.040 0.035 0.036
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
[0.021]∗ [0.022]∗
fem × time -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007
(0.012) (0.003)∗∗ (0.008) (0.005)
[0.015] [0.015]
post × time 0.001 -0.002
(0.010) (0.013)
[0.014]
post -0.440 -0.322 -0.395
(0.084)∗∗∗ (0.091)∗∗∗ (0.108)∗∗∗
[0.141]∗∗∗ [0.079]∗∗∗
female -2.649 -2.651 -2.710 -2.715 -2.783 -2.757
(0.059)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.114)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.067)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗
[0.236]∗∗∗ [0.235]∗∗∗ [0.253]∗∗∗ [0.250]∗∗∗
time 0.176 0.168 0.138
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
[0.011]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗∗
Constant 26.319 23.947 26.251 23.521 26.856 24.628
(0.070)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗ (0.063)∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
[0.198]∗∗∗ [0.187]∗∗∗ [0.188]∗∗∗ [0.185]∗∗∗
YOM FEs YES YES YES
Observations 167416 167416 167416 167416 60 60
R-Squared 0.246 0.246 0.246 0.247
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for re-
ligiosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses; robust standard
errors clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. Columns 5–6: Generalized least squares regression with
data collapsed to the gender-year-of-marriage level. Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for
panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation parameter for each group) , in parentheses. Data from
the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in marriage by age 38 suggests that women are delaying marriage, but not forgoing it entirely.
Overall, this analysis suggests that the decrease in average marriage age after the policy change
is mostly driven by women delaying marriages from their mid- and late-twenties into their thirties
and even late thirties.
Figure 5: Regression Coefficients for Effect of IVF Law on Marrying by a Given Age
(a) Intercept coefficient (b) Slope coefficient
Notes: The figures presents the point estimates and confidence intervals of the coefficients on (a) the interaction
term fem×post and (b) the interaction term fem×post×time, for regressions where the outcome is a binary variable
indicating whether or not the individual got married at or before a certain age, and the specification is as in column
(3) in table 3. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
Quandt Likelihood Ratio breakpoint test To confirm that what we are picking up is truly a
discontinuous shift in age at first marriage—a break in the time series—rather than more gradual
time trends, we perform a Quandt Likelihood Test to “search” for the most likely break year in
the data, over our entire sample period except for the standard 15% “trimming” on either end, to
account for limited data at the beginning and end of the sample period. We perform this test for
age at first marriage, because it is the outcome measure that should have the cleanest “break” at
1994, since the education outcomes rely on cohorts entering in 1994, which may be imprecise, and
spousal income relies on shifts in the marriage market, which may take more time.
To implement the test, we run a loop of regressions identical in specification to our columns 3
and 4 regressions, except the “break” year changes in each regression. We then perform an F-test
for whether the two “break” parameters—slope and intercept—are different from zero. Finally, we
search for the maximal F-stat among these tests.
As shown in Table 4, the test returns the highest F-statistic for 1994, which indicates that
the year of the policy change and hence our treatment year is the most probable break year.
Moreover, this break is significant even when accounting for the multiple tests used to identify
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it. The procedure for the QLR specifies comparing this “sup(F-stat)” to a table of critical values
adjusted for the number of tests: the critical value for two restrictions and 15% trimming is 5.86,
whereas the QLR statistic for age at first marriage for the “break” year is 10.38 or 10.78, depending
on whether fixed effects are used or not. This shows strong evidence of a break specifically at 1994.
Table 4: Quandt Likelihood Ratio test for break
point
F-Statistic
Year of Marriage No FEs With YoM FEs
1983 7.05 7.40
1984 7.28 7.67
1985 7.29 7.69
1986 7.40 7.85
1987 7.83 8.27
1988 8.06 8.35
1989 8.12 8.36
1990 8.09 8.27
1991 8.03 8.16
1992 7.83 8.11
1993 8.57 8.91
1994 10.38 10.78
1995 7.19 7.49
1996 6.49 6.75
1997 5.61 5.86
1998 5.97 6.14
1999 3.95 4.07
2000 4.52 4.69
2001 4.02 4.16
2002 3.95 4.03
2003 2.60 2.64
2004 1.03 1.04
Notes: Table reports F stats from a regression according to
the specification in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, where the hy-
pothesis is that the coefficients on post × fem and post × fem
× time equal 0, and “post” is defined as being greater than or
equal to the indicated year. Standard errors are not clustered
in this case, as clustering is not conventional in QLR models,
but similar results are obtained with clustering.
4.2 Education and Career Choices
College Education We now turn to women’s educational investments, and subsequent career
outcomes. First, we examine the impact of the policy on college completion. At the time of the
policy change, Israeli women’s median age for college entry was 22.5.34 This, combined with high
34As reported by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. This later college entry is due to the two to three years
period of mandatory military service following high school, and the typical one year period to take entry exams
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average fertility rates, means that changes in reproductive time horizons could be expected to affect
even college educational decisions (as opposed to in the US, where decisions about college are made
earlier).
Because our data is cross-sectional, we identify as “treated” birth cohorts that were young
enough to still be making the relevant educational decisions after the policy was announced (and
beliefs were updated). Figure 6 shows the raw data used in this analysis, charting women’s college
completion compared to men, by year of birth. In our main specifications, we use the median
age of college entry to define the post period as starting in 1971.35 We assume cohorts born
after this point are able to be influenced in their college-going decisions by new information about
reproductive time horizons, whereas older cohorts would have already committed to an educational
path.36 However, since there is some variation in college-entry age, the treatment may be somewhat
“fuzzy.” To address this, we additionally construct a continuous treatment variable that measures
the level of each cohort’s exposure to treatment, i.e. the percent of the cohort that has not yet
entered college.37 Using this measure, in figure A1, we draw a “treatment interval” starting at the
1969 cohort, where approximately 25% are treated and ending at the 1973 cohort with about 75%
treated. Our choice for the “sharp” cutoff, namely 1971, rests precisely in the middle of this term,
during which the treatment was very rapidly deployed.
Both figures show that men and women’s college education moves roughly in parallel prior to the
1994 time change, seemingly responding to common shocks, with the exception of the earliest three
cohorts, in which a different pattern is present. This creates a slight upward pre-trend in women’s
education relative to men’s. We therefore include group-specific time trends in the DID regression
specification. Following the policy change, there is a sharp change in the slope of women’s college
completion relative to men. The “fuzziness” of the timing, in addition to the continued increase in
knowledge over time, may be partially responsible for the pattern being more of a trend break than
a discrete before-and-after jump. We interpret this effect as causal in light of the strong evidence
for a trend break in age at first marriage, which suggests a sharp disruption to outcomes in 1994.
This break is likely merely distributed over multiple cohorts in the educational results.
These results are presented formally in a regression in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates
for a simple difference-in-differences specification, with men as the control group and gender-specific
time trends. The interaction between being female and of college-entering-age after the year of the
policy change is positive and significant, showing a 2.5 percentage point increase in rates of college
following that. In addition, military service may start and end “off cycle” with the academic year, further delaying
college entry.
35Men’s median age for college entry is 24. Because men enter college slightly later, we experiment with shifting
the treatment year for men as one of our robustness checks, shown in the appendix. See table A4.
36We find additional support for this choice of cutoff based on our findings regarding marriage age, where 23 (the
age of the 1971 cohort in 1994) is in the age range with the most substantial tendency to delay marriage following
the policy change.
37The calculations of the continuous treatment variable are based on the age distribution of college entrants in
1993, as reported in the 1995 Census data.
25
Figure 6: Female vs. Male College Education
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows average college attainment for women and men by birth cohort. Figure (b) presents the
difference in college attainment between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre (1951-1970 birth cohorts)
and post (1971-1977 birth cohorts) periods. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born
Jews.
completion for women, relative to men, between the pre and post period. This represents an 8%
increase in rates of college education from the average 31% level for women in the pre period. This
effect remains stable when year of birth fixed effects are introduced. Then, in columns 3 and 4,
differential post trends are introduced, revealing that the effect is driven primarily by the change in
slope. This is expected since, as discussed above, the exposure to treatment is in fact gradual, and
educational decisions may be path dependent based on earlier choices. This specification is repeated
using GLS estimation in columns 5 and 6. For this purpose our unit of observation is the group of
same gender individuals born in a specific year (e.g. men born in 1968), and we collapse the data
to means accordingly. As mentioned above, we correct standard errors for potential cross-sectional
correlation and assume a gender-unique AR(1) process to account for potential serial correlation.
To account for the “fuzziness” in treated status based on cohort, in Table A1, we present a
regression that classifies a portion of each cohort as treated based on which percentage of individuals
would have not yet entered college, according to data from the 1995 Census on college entry ages.
These percentages are allowed to be different for men and women, which accounts for the fact that
men on average enter college later. These results again show a significant impact of being in the
“treated” cohorts.38
To rule out a general change in education-seeking, either by the 1971 cohort or based on other
things happening in 1994, we perform a placebo test using high school completion. Those on
38The differential and gradual exposure to treatment specification captures a separate non-linear time trend for
men and women, hence we estimate a standard DiD only in this case.
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Table 5: College Graduation Rates
Dependent variable: College Education
DiD with GSTT Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.025 0.025 0.009 0.009 0.020 0.013
(0.011)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.008) (0.012)∗ (0.009)
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
fem × post × time 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
[0.004]∗ [0.004]∗
fem × time 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
[0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗
post × time -0.009 -0.001
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.003)
[0.003]∗∗∗
post -0.015 0.007 0.021
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011)∗
[0.012] [0.010]
female 0.059 0.059 0.055 0.055 0.051 0.053
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
[0.025]∗∗ [0.025]∗∗ [0.026]∗∗ [0.026]∗∗
time 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
[0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗
Constant 0.505 0.394 0.512 0.392 0.326 0.257
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
[0.026]∗∗∗ [0.024]∗∗∗ [0.026]∗∗∗ [0.024]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Observations 173790 173790 173790 173790 54 54
R-Squared 0.108 0.109 0.109 0.109
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for reli-
giosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors
clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. Columns 5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data col-
lapsed to the gender-year-of-birth level. Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific
serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli
population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the margin of completing high school are unlikely to make this choice based on older-age fertility
prospects. Figure A2 demonstrates that, as expected, there is no impact on this outcome either
if we are timing the break at the same cohort as for college graduation (1971—in case there was
a shock to this cohort’s educational outcomes for non-IVF reasons) or if we use those who would
be entering their junior year (and thus still able to change their high school completion decision)
in 1994 (1978 cohort—in case there was a shock to all educational outcomes in 1994 not driven by
the IVF policy change). Figure A3 confirms this result using administrative data on the number of
high school students passing the matriculation exams (“Bagrut”) by gender and birth year. While
the number of students passing the test increases for both genders, the ratio of women to men
remains stable for the Jewish population of Israel (while there is an increase in this ratio for the
Arab population of Israel).
Graduate Education We next examine whether more women completed graduate education
following the policy change. For this outcome measure, we again use the median age of students
entering that educational level to guide us, therefore treating the 1966 cohort as the first treated
year.39 The raw data is shown in Figure 7, showing again a clear increase in women’s completion
relative to men starting at the cohorts who have not completed their educational decisions before
they learn of expanded access to IVF. While women’s educational outcomes remain on a moderately
increasing relatively stable trend in the pre-period, for men we find inconsistently low rates of
graduate education for the 1954 to 1958 cohorts.40 Nevertheless, women demonstrate an upward
shift at the 1966 cohort, while men seem to follow approximately the same pre-trend (if we disregard
the aforementioned irregularity).
This is confirmed by the findings presented in Table 6. Columns 1–2 show estimates for the
simple DiD specification with gender-specific time trends. Women in the “treated” cohorts are sig-
nificantly more likely to complete graduate degrees than before. The approximately 1.8 percentage
point increase is a much larger effect than that for college education, as the baseline level of grad-
uate education among women in the pre period is 11%. This effect thus represents a 16% increase
in completion of graduate education. When allowing for a discontinuous slope change, the main
effect is very similar and the slope change, while positive, is not significant. This is likely due to
the fact that we have fewer post period cohorts (to avoid censoring, since graduate education may
be completed later in life), in addition to the unstable trend exhibited for men in the pre period (as
discussed above). Nevertheless, the positive effect remains stable when year-of-birth fixed effects
are included, and the GLS specification confirms the magnitude of the results, although due to
having very few observations (46), it is only marginally significant in column 5, and not significant
39The median age for second degree applicants in Israel is 28.2 for women and 29.7 for men.
40We can speculate that these cohorts may have been entering military service during the 1973 Yom Kippur war
and the period of hostility that followed, which may have impacted their long-term educational attainment, but have
not found any literature indicating a reason for this decline.
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Figure 7: Female vs. Male Graduate Education
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows average graduate school attainment for women and men by birth cohort. Figure (b) presents
the difference in graduate school attainment between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre (1951-1965
birth cohorts) and post (1966-1973 birth cohorts) periods. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted
to Israeli-born Jews.
in column 6.41
We also look at whether rates of women gaining graduate education conditional on obtaining
college education have increased, in table 7. In doing this, we seek to understand whether graduate
education has increased as a natural consequence of the increase in college education, or whether
there has been an increase in graduate education over and above the mechanical impact of increasing
the pool of college graduates. Because we are conditioning on an endogenous variable, as college
education is also impacted by the treatment, the magnitude of this effect should be interpreted with
caution. Nonetheless, the fact that we see a positive and significant increase indicates the change
in graduate education is not merely driven by a greater pipeline of college graduates. The larger
results for graduate education, and the further increase conditional on college education, supports
our main hypothesis that extended later-life fertility for women drives the observed shifts, since
decisions on graduate education are made at an older age when expected fertility plays a much
more important role.
Repeated-cross-section data One may be concerned about data censoring in the educational
outcomes, since we use data collected in a single year and therefore compare individuals of different
ages over time. To minimize this problem, the youngest cohort we use in our estimation is 31 at
the census year, as discussed in section 3.2. In this section, we use a different data set comprised
41Using the GLS model with a standard DID specification, as in columns (1) and (2), renders effects that are
significant at the 5% level.
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Table 6: Rates of Graduate Education
Dependent variable: Graduate Education
DiD with GSTT Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014
(0.007)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗ (0.009)
[0.009]∗∗ [0.009]∗∗ [0.008]∗ [0.008]∗
fem × post × time 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.002] [0.002]
fem × time -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
post × time -0.003 0.001
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)
[0.002]∗∗
post -0.014 -0.008 -0.003
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗ (0.007)
[0.006]∗∗ [0.006]
female 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
time 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗
[0.001]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗
Constant 0.218 0.190 0.223 0.212 0.117 0.104
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
[0.015]∗∗∗ [0.013]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗∗ [0.016]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Observations 138953 138953 138953 138953 46 46
R-Squared 0.0463 0.0465 0.0464 0.0465
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for reli-
giosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors
clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. Columns 5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data col-
lapsed to the gender-year-of-birth level. Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific
serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli
population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Conditional Rates of Graduate Education
Dependent variable: Graduate Education | College
DiD with GSTT Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.049
(0.021)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗ (0.027)∗
[0.022]∗∗∗ [0.021]∗∗∗ [0.022]∗∗ [0.021]∗∗∗
fem × post × time 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
[0.004] [0.004]
fem × time -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗
[0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗
post × time -0.009 -0.006
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.004)
[0.004]∗∗
post -0.054 -0.039 -0.031
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.022)
[0.017]∗∗∗ [0.016]∗∗
female -0.055 -0.055 -0.059 -0.060 -0.060 -0.059
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗
[0.014]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗∗
time 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)∗∗ (0.002)
[0.001] [0.002]∗∗
Constant 0.463 0.431 0.476 0.469 0.417 0.405
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗
[0.012]∗∗∗ [0.023]∗∗∗ [0.012]∗∗∗ [0.013]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Observations 45609 45609 45609 45609 46 46
R-Squared 0.0128 0.0136 0.0132 0.0136
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for reli-
giosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors
clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. Columns 5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data col-
lapsed to the gender-year-of-birth level. Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific
serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli
population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of annually repeated cross-sections, the Israeli Labor Force Survey (LFS), to verify that censoring
is not what drives the result. This data allows us to compare individuals of the same age before
and after the policy change. Because of the limited years of availability, and small sample size, we
do not use this data as our main source.42
We use three-year age groups to increase the number of observations per year and decrease
variation (although the sample remains quite small). We choose ages to be high enough so we can
be confident that there is minimal censoring due to ongoing education, but also young enough that
we can follow what happens to this age group for several years after 1994.43
Figure 8 presents levels of education, for women and men of the same age range, by their year
of birth. Figure (a) shows percentage of college graduates in each cohort, separately for men and
for women. We clearly see that while men stay on the same moderately increasing time trend,
women’s rate of college completion sharply increases for the cohorts most affected by the policy
change, although the largest change here appears for the 1970 cohort.44 The same analysis is
presented in figure (b) for graduate level education. Interestingly, we observe two “jumps” for
women, the first for the 1966 cohort and the second for the 1971 cohort. It seems reasonable
that the first increase is driven by women who had already completed college when the policy was
introduced and due to the policy faced a decreased cost of attending graduate education. The
second increase correlates with the increase in college attainment and is at least partially driven
by the higher rates of women who are college graduates and can actually consider post college
education. These findings refute the possibility that the results we presented above are the result
of data censoring differentially impacting men’s outcomes.
Moreover, this data set is sampled and assembled completely differently from our principal
data, and yet shows remarkably similar results. This provides additional evidence that there was a
differential increase in women’s investment in higher education, starting with the cohorts who had
the opportunity to enter either college or graduate school in 1994.
Alternative control: Arab-Israeli women Our identification strategy relies on the post-1994
time-path of men’s outcomes being similar to women’s in the absence of the IVF policy change
(once pre-trends and level effects have been controlled for). A threat to this identification would be
a policy, or any other exogenous shock, that affected Israeli women, but not men, commencing at
or around the time of the 1994 IVF policy change. The QLR analysis above, as well as the event
studies presented in Section 4.4, show that such a change would need to be very precisely timed
42We utilize The Israeli Annual Labor Force Survey for the years 2001 to 2011. The sample is representative of the
population and follows the evolution of the labor force in Israel at the household level.
43It should be noted that our results are not sensitive to this choice and the same pattern appears for a variety of
age ranges.
44The largest effect in the Census data appears at the 1971 cohort, however, these data are collected using a
different sample and methods than the Census, and we expect a “fuzzy” cutoff for treatment status for educational
outcomes.
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Figure 8: Female vs. Male College Education, Labor Force Survey
(a) College (b) Graduate
Notes: Figure (a) presents the fraction of men and women with college education by birth cohort. Figure (b)
presents the fraction of men and women with graduate education by birth cohort. For college, all individuals are
between age 35 and 37. For graduate education, all individuals are between age 38 and 40. The age ranges were
chosen to avoid censoring while focusing on the cohorts which are most relevant to the policy change. Data from
the Labor Force Survey 2001-2011, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
to coincide with the IVF policy change in order to produce similar results. One specific concern
is a reform in higher-education, that rolled out during the eighties and ninties. The reform, which
obviously had an impact on Israelis’ college graduation rates, could potentially have a differential
effect on women.
We explore the possibility that the higher education reform differentially affected women using
the Arab population of Israel, which would have been unlikely to respond substantially to the IVF
reform, but was targeted by the education expansion. Arab-Israelis were much more likely than
Jewish-Israelis to be affected by the higher education reform due to lower high-school achievements
(on average) and higher concentration in peripheral areas.45 On the other hand, as we mention in
section 3.2, Arab-Israelis were less likely (if at all) to respond to the change in IVF funding for three
main reasons. First, most Arab-Israelis are Muslim and Islam places more stringent restrictions on
the use of IVF than does Judaism.46 Second, Arab-Israeli women were much less likely to be on the
margin of large career investments in the 1990s, as average educational levels were substantially
45This effect is described in Volanski (2005) and also in various reports issued by the Israeli council for higher
education (e.g. Higher education in Israel 2014, pp. 29-31).
46For example, Islam prohibits the use of donor eggs or sperm, the former being extremely important and even
crucial for women in their forties, and requires significant precautions to guarantee the egg and sperm come from the
correct mother and father and cannot have been contaminated. In addition, the Israeli Jewish religious leadership
very quickly addressed the innovative IVF technology and approved usage with practically no limitations, whereas
other religions took longer to respond.
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lower than in the Jewish population. At our baseline year 1993, there is a 25 percentage point
difference in the rate of women’s college attainment between Jews and Arabs, and a 10 percentage
point difference in the same figures for graduate education (Arab women’s attainment in graduate
education was actually very close to zero at that time). Third, since the Arab population is not
subject to obligatory military service, they tend to make decisions about career investment when
they are 2-3 years younger, making fertility considerations less relevant for educational decisions.47
We thus re-estimate the impact of the policy change on Jewish women’s education using Arab
women, rather than Jewish men, as the comparison group. This complementary strategy allows us
to difference out the impact of being female following the policy change. Since Arab-Israeli women
would have been targeted by, and affected by, any government program that has the potential to
increase women’s education, this helps rule out that other policies, or any other unspecified gender-
specific social trends (e.g., “women’s liberation”), may have been responsible for the observed
changes. At the same time, the Arab population may also be affected by events that are specific
to their community and irrelevant to the Jewish population in Israel, and therefore this strategy
would certainly be imperfect on its own. However, any bias caused by factors specific to the
Arab population would be uncorrelated with any bias caused by features that relate to gender.
Thus, finding a consistent differential effect on Jewish women using both control groups provides
a compelling piece of evidence that this effect is caused by the increased access to IVF.
To capture any effects that could have possibly impacted women entering college in 1994, we
need to use the birth cohort of Arab women that would be entering college at the same time
as Jewish women. Thus, in our figures and the following regression analysis we compare Jewish
women to three-years-younger Arab women and align the affected cohorts for the two groups to
match college entry at 1994.48 All of the results hold and are qualitatively similar when we do not
adjust for this difference and conduct the analysis using year of birth.
Figures 9 and 10 show the difference between Jewish and Arab women using raw data on
college and graduate education completion. These figures also show these outcomes separately
by population group. Although the pre-trends are not parallel, as with the male control group,
a similar increase in both types of education is clearly observed at 1994 only for Jewish women.
Tables 8 and 9 confirm that the main findings for education hold using the alternate Arab-female
control group. The magnitude of the coefficients is quite similar to the results for the male control
group (3.1 percentage points in the college DiD specification here, versus 2.5 in the male control;
47In addition, the Arab population has a much lower average age at first marriage for women, a higher average birth
rate, and a much lower labor force participation rate for women. In our baseline year 1993, for example, Arab women
marry 2.5 years earlier than Jewish women. Labor force participation rates in the early-mid 90s was approximately
13% for Arab-Israeli Muslim women compared to around 55% for Jewish-Israeli women (based on data from the
Labor Force Surveys and macro data reported by the Bank of Israel.
48Military service for Jewish women is two years long, but macro data shows a three year difference in the median
age of college applicants between the two populations, most likely due to waiting periods before and after entering
military service.
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2.2 percentage points in the graduate education DiD, versus 1.8 in the male control.). The slight
negative trend seen in columns 3 and 4 is most likely because the Jewish-Israeli population take
longer to complete their degrees and have a higher variation in age at college entry, but could also
be due to more recent increases in education among the Arab population, from policies designed to
encourage education in under-served areas. However, the Jewish× post coefficient is positive and
significant in all specifications and the overall effect remains positive throughout the ‘post’ period".
Figure 9: College Education for Arab vs. Jewish Women
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: The figure compares college completion rates between Jewish and Arab women over time. The cohorts are
aligned based on anticipated year of college entry, since Arab women do not serve in the military, and tend to enter
college three years younger than Jewish women (as calculated in 1995 census data, and reported by the Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics). Therefore, the first “treated” cohort is the 1971 cohort for Jewish women, and the 1974 cohort
for Arab women. Figure (a) shows average college attainment by population group. Figure (b) presents the difference
in college attainment between Jewish and Arab women, as well as fitted lines for the pre and post periods. Data
from the 2008 Israeli population census.
Although we use the Arab control principally to address educational results, Table A2 shows the
results for age at first marriage, where we see that Jewish-Israeli women experience a differential
increase in age at first marriage, beginning in 1994, compared to Arab-Israeli women.49 Note, that
the estimated effect is considerably larger then the one reported in Table 3, which may be because
Arab women are not affected in equilibrium by Jewish women postponing marriages, while Jewish
men, the marriage partners of Jewish women, are likely to be.
Combining the results in this section with the ones in our main specifications establishes that
the most likely cause for the observed change in Jewish women’s educational and marriage choices
is the increased access to IVF. Any other explanation would have to induce both a gender and
religion-divergent impact precisely in 1994, in addition to affecting all of the outcomes we consider.
49For spousal income, we did not use men as the principal control group, but rather women who married younger,
and thus there is no scope for the alternate Arab control.
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Table 8: College Graduation Rates (Arab Control)
Dependent variable: College Education
DiD with GSTT Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
jewish × post 0.031 0.030 0.043 0.042 0.038 0.042
(0.013)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
[0.013]∗∗ [0.013]∗∗ [0.015]∗∗∗ [0.015]∗∗∗
jewish × post × time -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.002)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗ (0.002)∗∗
[0.004] [0.004]
jewish × time 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
[0.001]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗ [0.001]∗∗
post × time 0.009 0.010
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗
[0.002]∗∗∗
post 0.026 0.004 0.003
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.006) (0.007)
[0.007]∗∗∗ [0.010]
jewish 0.243 0.243 0.246 0.246 0.248 0.246
(0.009)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
[0.027]∗∗∗ [0.027]∗∗∗ [0.028]∗∗∗ [0.028]∗∗∗
time 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
[0.000]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗
Constant 0.134 0.058 0.129 0.142 0.129 0.060
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
[0.013]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗∗ [0.013]∗∗∗ [0.020]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Observations 125229 125229 125229 125229 54 54
R-Squared 0.0742 0.0748 0.0744 0.0748
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data (no controls included since
religiosity and parents’ origin controls used only apply to Jewish population). Robust standard errors clustered at the group
× cohort level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the group × geography level in square brackets. Columns
5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the population group-college cohort level. Robust standard
errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation
parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: Graduate Education Rates (Arab Control Group)
Dependent variable: Graduate Education
DiD with GSTT Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
jewish × post 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
[0.007]∗∗∗ [0.007]∗∗∗ [0.007]∗∗ [0.007]∗∗
jewish × post × time 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001)∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
[0.002] [0.002]
jewish × time -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)∗∗ (0.000) (0.000)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
post × time 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.001]
post -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.003)∗ (0.003)∗ (0.003)∗
[0.004] [0.004]
jewish 0.096 0.096 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
[0.010]∗∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗ [0.010]∗∗∗
time 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
[0.000]∗∗∗ [0.000]∗∗∗
Constant 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.004
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)
[0.003]∗∗∗ [0.005]∗∗∗ [0.003]∗∗∗ [0.005]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Observations 100724 100724 100724 100724 46 46
R-Squared 0.0267 0.0269 0.0267 0.0269
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data (no controls included since
religiosity and parents’ origin controls used only apply to Jewish population). Robust standard errors clustered at the group
× cohort level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the group × geography level in square brackets. Columns
5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the population group-graduate cohort level. Robust standard
errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation
parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 10: Graduate Education for Arab vs. Jewish Women
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: The figure compares graduate education completion rates between Jewish and Arab women over time. The
cohorts are aligned based on anticipated year of graduate school entry, since Arab women do not serve in the military,
and tend to enter college three years younger than Jewish women (as calculated in 1995 census data, and reported by
the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics). Therefore, the first “treated” cohort is the 1966 cohort for Jewish women,
and the 1969 cohort for Arab women. Figure (a) shows average graduate school attainment by population group.
Figure (b) presents the difference in graduate school attainment between Jewish and Arab women, as well as fitted
lines for the pre and post periods. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census.
Women’s Labor Market Outcomes To supplement our findings regarding educational out-
comes, we examine the impact of the policy change on treated cohorts’ full-time employment,
income, and participation in “prestigious” (high-investment) occupations, using the same cohorts
and treatment definition as for college graduation. Figure 11 plots women’s rate of full-time em-
ployment, relative to men’s, and shows a clear upwards shift for women of the same cohorts whose
higher education levels increased following the policy change. This supports our hypothesis that
the extended horizons offered to women by IVF expansion enabled women to enter more demanding
career paths and shift from part-time employment (characteristic of women with family constraints)
to full-time employment. These findings are corroborated by an increase in female earnings relative
to male earnings, presented in figure A4. Moreover, there is a sharp differential increase in the
percentage of women in prestigious occupations requiring high human capital investments, such
as management, engineering, law, medicine, and academia, presented in figure A5. These occupa-
tions are notable for all requiring significant on-the-job training and long work hours, in addition
to educational preparation. If we break down these occupations, the positive shift appears to be
driven especially by lawyers and managers, which were found by Cortes and Pan (2017) to be the
occupations with the highest returns to working long hours.
Table 10 presents regression results for these three outcomes, using a DiD specification that
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Figure 11: Female vs. Male Full-Time Employment
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows rates of full-time employment out of the employed population for women and men by birth
cohort. Figure (b) presents the difference in these rates between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre
(1951-1970 birth cohorts) and post (1971-1977 birth cohorts) periods (cohorts correspond to our analysis of college
attainment). Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
allows for a differential slope change in the post period, with and without year of birth fixed effects.
Columns 1 and 2 show a significant increase of 3 percentage points in women’s full-time employment,
on an initial level of approximately 60%, almost 30 percentage points less than men. In addition,
full-time employment kept increasing for younger cohorts, by roughly 1 percentage point per year
amounting to a total of 10 percentage points for the last cohort in our analysis. For income and
participation in prestigious occupations, we observe a positive and significant differential change
in trend (for prestigious occupations it is only significant when fixed effects are added in column
6). The increase in income, listed in Shekels, represents a gain of more than $1,000 per year for
women’s income relative to men. Based on the coefficient on “female,” the initial gender wage gap is
around $20,000. Thus, in the seven years following the policy change, almost a third of this gap was
eliminated. This reduction in the pay gap is much larger (in proportion) than the one we observe
for full-time employment, suggesting that women’s wages increased, regardless of working hours.50
One possible channel for this is the concordant increased participation in prestigious, high-paying
occupations.
These results show that the cohorts affected by the IVF policy change not only got more edu-
cation, but they made use of that education to participate more in the labor force at a higher level,
thus bolstering our hypothesis that the overall treatment effects are driven by a desire for greater
career investment. The educational effects of the policy translated into better career outcomes,
50Estimating the same specifications for women’s income conditional on full-time employment yields positive and
significant results that support this conclusion.
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rather than women achieving high-powered education, but then dropping out of professional oc-
cupations, as in Bertrand, Goldin and Katz (2010). This suggests that differential fertility time
horizons can meaningfully contribute to disparities in labor market outcomes.
Table 10: Women’s Labor Market Outcomes
Dependent Variable: Full-Time Annual Prestigious
Employment Income Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.032 0.032 804.5 868.9 0.001 0.001
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (3452.5) (2017.8) (0.008) (0.004)
[0.008]∗∗∗ [0.008]∗∗∗ [3615.2] [3585.4] [0.012] [0.012]
fem × post × time 0.010 0.010 5443.2 5432.9 0.002 0.002
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (450.0)∗∗∗ (314.2)∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.001)∗∗∗
[0.002]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗ [927.4]∗∗∗ [927.0]∗∗∗ [0.003] [0.003]
fem × time -0.001 -0.001 560.459 563.438 0.001 0.001
(0.001)∗ (0.000)∗∗ (257.840)∗∗ (130.394)∗∗∗ (0.001) (0.000)∗∗
[0.001] [0.001] [303.143]∗ [301.043]∗ [0.001] [0.001]
post × time -0.006 -8712.434 -0.010
(0.001)∗∗∗ (368.996)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
[0.001]∗∗∗ [930.193]∗∗∗ [0.002]∗∗∗
post -0.002 -4934.203 0.002
(0.003) (2756.126)∗ (0.004)
[0.004] [3042.923] [0.009]
female -0.297 -0.297 -79535.047 -79557.940 -0.068 -0.068
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (3012.548)∗∗∗ (1468.201)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
[0.011]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗∗ [6956.278]∗∗∗ [6952.937]∗∗∗ [0.017]∗∗∗ [0.017]∗∗∗
time 0.002 -1081.671 0.002
(0.000)∗∗∗ (192.965)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
[0.000]∗∗∗ [262.103]∗∗∗ [0.001]∗∗∗
Constant 0.948 0.901 202462.2 221179.2 0.427 0.384
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (3388.6)∗∗∗ (3681.9)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
[0.006]∗∗∗ [0.007]∗∗∗ [8658.3]∗∗∗ [11145.1]∗∗∗ [0.016]∗∗∗ [0.022]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES
Age Poly. YES
Observations 133206 133206 153522 153522 147231 147231
R-Squared 0.135 0.135 0.123 0.124 0.0480 0.0482
Notes: All columns: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religios-
ity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the age group × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors
clustered at the age group × geography level in square brackets. Columns 3 and 4 control for a flexible polynomial in age. Data
from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.3 Marriage Market Equilibrium
The additional reproductive years afforded by access to assisted reproduction technologies may have
impacted not only women’s decisions, but also men’s marriage choices. Low (2017) shows that men
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respond to prospective mates’ expected fertility when choosing a partner, trading off between so-
called “reproductive capital” and more traditional human capital traits like income and education.
As a result, women who are high-earning, but older, may marry poorer men than lower-earning,
but younger, women. These marriage market consequences to investment are crucially important
because they may in turn deter women’s investments, by adding an additional cost to women’s own
utility impact of foregone fertility.
Fertility extending technology thus has the potential to blunt both the individual impacts
and the marriage market effects of increased investment. Because the increase in access to IVF
technology lessens the perceived fertility cost of waiting to marry, “high-quality” men may have
been more willing to marry older women following the policy change. If this is the case, we can
expect equilibrium matching to adjust so that these women will match with higher quality partners.
This equilibrium shift would be accelerated by women also changing their marriage timing, creating
a thicker marriage market for older women.
We test this by examining the spousal quality of women who marry older versus younger before
and after the policy change. If women’s reproductive fitness is taken into account by men, we would
expect the “spousal quality penalty” to older women to lessen once access to IVF expands.51 We
use administrative data on income, provided by the tax authority and paired with the Census’s
survey data. Women are matched to their spouses in the data based on relationship to household
head. We only have spousal income data for the current spouse, so this analysis excludes women
who are divorced or widowed before the census year.
We compare spousal quality, measured in a variety of ways, for married women who were
between 25 and 29 at the time of marriage versus women who were between 30 and 34 at the
time of marriage. Restricting to women who were between 25 and 34 at marriage ensures that we
compare relatively similar groups of women. At the same time, placing the cutoff at the age of 30
helps us identify the response to the change in expected fecundity for older women, which becomes
significantly more relevant when a woman hits her thirties.
Our main proxy for spousal quality is husband’s income, as it is well established that income is
an important quality that male spouses bring to the relationship (see, for example, Fisman et al.
(2006)). To control for age effects, since we use cross-sectional data, and women who marry at
different ages may have spouses of different ages as well, we include a flexible polynomial in age
as a control. Because for very young or very old spouses income may provide a distorted measure
of quality, even with age controls, as they may still be completing school and career training, or
already retired, we restrict our analysis to the marriage years 1986 to 2003, which in turn restricts
the age range of spouses. This year range was chosen based on an analysis of men’s rate of full-time
51Note that although the selection into who marries older versus younger is changing, Low (2017) shows it would
be lower human capital women who are now willing to delay marriage. Despite that, in equilibrium we would expect
on average an improvement in older women’s marriage outcomes as reproductive time horizons are extended. We
account for selection by directly controlling for wives’ characteristics, and showing our results are unchanged.
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employment over age and the distribution of average husband’s age by wife’s age. Our qualitative
results are not sensitive to the exact year-range chosen. In the regression results, we present results
with additional controls as well as alternate quality measures, such as education and occupational
choice.
Figure 12 shows how our the residual of spousal income regressed on a flexible age polynomial
evolves over time, by year of marriage. Starting in 1996, two years after the policy change was
announced, we observe a distinct shift upward in spousal income for women who marry over 30,
relative to the same measure for women who marry younger, which remains very stable over time.
The fact that this break appears with a lag may be attributed to men’s perceptions taking longer
to update or simply to the fact that reaching this new matching-equilibrium takes time.
Figure 12: Spousal Income for Older vs. Younger Women, 1986 - 2003
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: This figure compares current spousal income for women who married at age 30-34 to women who married at
age 25-29. In order to control for age effects, the measure of spousal income used is the residual from a regression
of income on a flexible polynomial in age. We use a narrower time range in these graphs to prevent censoring from
individuals either still being students, for younger cohorts, or entering retirement, for older cohorts. Figure (a) shows
average income-age-residuals separately by age group, by year of marriage. Figure (b) presents the differences in
spousal income-age-residual, as well as fitted lines for the pre (1986-1993) and post (1994-2003) periods. Data from
the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
Table 11 presents the results from a regression of spousal income on marrying older, before
and after the policy change, controlling for spousal age with a flexible polynomial (for the GLS
specification, we first regress income on the flexible polynomial in age, then take the residuals,
then collapse to cells). The results confirm that there is a significant “penalty” in terms of spousal
income for women who choose to marry over thirty, and that this penalty significantly decreases
in the post period. Depending on the specification, we observe a reduction of between 60 and 100
percent in the “older marriage penalty” for women. This change is significant with both types of
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clustering, and in the GLS specification. Note that the magnitude of the increase in spousal income
is very similar throughout the specifications, however the estimated initial penalty for marrying
older is larger when we use GLS. As previously mentioned, we do not include a specification that
allows for a change in slope for this outcome measure, due to the narrow band of years and the
lagged response.
Table 11: Spousal Income
Dependent variable: Spousal Income
DiD GLS DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
older × post 19316.144 20697.644 17540.641 16639.053
(7616.659)∗∗ (6392.176)∗∗∗ (4907.371)∗∗∗ (5191.417)∗∗∗
[7862.496]∗∗ [8196.525]∗∗
post 1564.801 6849.849
(6146.128) (6418.767)
[6367.385]
married older -19882.047 -20813.945 -29654.893 -29069.648
(6133.012)∗∗∗ (5872.047)∗∗∗ (4131.902)∗∗∗ (4377.880)∗∗∗
[13070.829] [12923.828]
time -2786.126 -710.612
(766.338)∗∗∗ (563.463)
[710.951]∗∗∗
Constant -393935.497 -589998.553 48803.834 46272.107
(939517.549) (930193.480) (3900.803)∗∗∗ (991.128)∗∗∗
[835939.612] [789565.836]
YOM FEs YES YES
Observations 18543 18543 36 36
R-Squared 0.0518 0.0530
Notes: All columns control for a flexible fifth-order polynomial in spousal age. Columns 1–2: Ordinary least-squares difference-
in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered
at the age group × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the age group × geography level in square
brackets. Columns 3–4: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the age group-year-of-marriage level.
Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique
autocorrelation parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-
born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the appendix we use a triple-differences specification to compare the older-versus-younger
results to those of men’s spouses based on their age at marriage. In this specification, the spousal
income for women who marry older versus younger, before and after the policy change are compared
to the same metrics for older versus younger men before and after the policy change. The results
in Table A3, show that not only do older women’s marriage outcomes (in terms of spousal quality)
improve relative to younger women’s following the policy change, but they also improve relative to
the change in older men’s spousal quality. However, because these effects will also reflect women’s
increased education and general equilibrium changes in matching patterns, the magnitude should
43
be interpreted with caution.
To test the robustness of these findings, we include additional controls and use alternative
measures of spousal quality. First, in columns 1 and 2 of the top part of table 12, we repeat
the spousal income regressions controlling for additional wife’s characteristics, namely education,
income and age. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that the increase in spousal income is not
a result of the improved quality of older brides themselves (given our results regarding women’s
increased education levels following the policy change). We find a slightly smaller reduction of the
“older marriage penalty”, mostly because the estimate for the initial penalty is about 20% larger
than the one reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 11. Second, in columns 3 and 4 we control
non-parametrically for spousal age by adding spouse’s year of birth fixed effects (instead of the
spousal age polynomial in our main specification). Our results remain significant and of the same
magnitude. Then, in columns 5 and 6, we use spouse’s income-for-age percentile, essentially a
“ranking” of this spouse amongst his age cohort, which avoids income level comparisons across
cohorts. The effect remains positive and significant using this measure.
In the bottom half of Table 12, we use three alternative measures of spousal quality that should
be less sensitive to age effects: spouse’s college education, full-time employment, and occupation
(measured by participation in a “prestigious,” high-paying field such as management, medicine,
and law). All three of these alternative approaches to measuring spousal quality provide positive,
significant results for the change in spousal quality for brides over thirty. In terms of magnitude,
these estimates are on the high end of our main results, indicating that 80-100 percent of the “older
marriage penalty” dissipated in the post period.
Together, these results provide strong evidence that spousal quality improved for older brides
following the policy change. The stark change in the marriage market equilibrium following the
significant change we observe in marriage timing and educational investment are consistent with
women and men changing their beliefs regarding older women’s fertility prospects. The changed
beliefs could have stemmed from both the direct effects of the policy, greater access to IVF, and
the broader awareness of fertility-extending technology brought on by the policy, as well as direct
observation of the increase in older motherhood that occurred. The combination of results across
different outcomes, women’s marriage timing, education, career outcomes, and marital outcomes,
strengthen our conclusion that the expansion of IVF was responsible for each individual change.
4.4 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
In this section, we perform robustness checks of our results and examine some potential alternative
explanations for our findings.
Permutation approach to significance levels In micro-data difference-in-differences studies,
one may be concerned that a high degree of intra-group correlation or correlation across time
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Table 12: Alternative Spousal Quality Specifications
Dep. Var.: Income Income Income Pctile
Wife Controls Sp. YOB FEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
older × post 18407.16 17905.36 20021.48 21651.21 0.026 0.026
(9397.97)∗ (8160.31)∗∗ (8171.83)∗∗ (6943.97)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
[8359.51]∗∗ [8408.73]∗∗ [7675.44]∗∗ [8034.79]∗∗∗ [0.015]∗ [0.015]∗
married older -24604.60 -26872.22 -20052.75 -21020.23 -0.051 -0.050
(11038.23)∗∗ (10227.43)∗∗ (6380.26)∗∗∗ (5965.34)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
[14415.39]∗ [14811.97]∗ [13088.46] [12978.08] [0.016]∗∗∗ [0.015]∗∗∗
Constant -167890.13 -520406.54 81715.40 94161.35 0.619 0.622
(721687.21) (756961.82) (10384.74)∗∗∗ (9848.97)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
[744709.09] [749225.14] [15645.78]∗∗∗ [18413.96]∗∗∗ [0.012]∗∗∗ [0.018]∗∗∗
Age Poly. YES YES
Wife Controls YES YES
Sp. YOB FEs YES YES
YOM FEs YES YES YES
Observations 16693 16693 18543 18543 18543 18543
R-Squared 0.104 0.105 0.0547 0.0557 0.0496 0.0510
Dep. Var.: College Full-time Prestigious
Education Employment Occupation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
older × post 0.039 0.039 0.045 0.043 0.053 0.053
(0.021)∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗
[0.023]∗ [0.022]∗ [0.014]∗∗∗ [0.014]∗∗∗ [0.017]∗∗∗ [0.017]∗∗∗
married older -0.051 -0.051 -0.052 -0.050 -0.042 -0.042
(0.015)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
[0.027]∗ [0.027]∗ [0.013]∗∗∗ [0.013]∗∗∗ [0.027] [0.027]
Constant 0.555 0.549 0.946 0.946 0.473 0.484
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
[0.024]∗∗∗ [0.039]∗∗∗ [0.008]∗∗∗ [0.016]∗∗∗ [0.022]∗∗∗ [0.026]∗∗∗
YOM FEs YES YES YES
Observations 19511 19511 16730 16730 18178 18178
R-Squared 0.0782 0.0791 0.114 0.116 0.0389 0.0400
Notes: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity and parents’
origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the age group × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the
age group × geography level in square brackets. Top panel: Columns 1 and 2 control for wife’s age, income and education.
Columns 3–4 control for spouse’s age through year-of-birth fixed effects. Columns 5–6 use spouse’s income-for-age percentile as
the outcome. Bottom panel: Columns 1–2 use spouse’s college education as the outcome variable. Columns 3–4 use spouse’s
full-time employment, defined on entire male population. Columns 5–6 use spouse’s participation in prestigious occupations
such as management, law, medicine, engineering, and academia. All specifications include coefficients for post and time. Data
from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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periods is driving the significance of the results. We have addressed this issue by providing two
alternative ways to cluster the standard errors, as well as GLS estimates that are collapsed to the
year-group level and allow for correlation within groups and across years. As an additional check
that our estimates are large relative to the true variation in the data, we also perform two types of
permutation analyses on our coefficients for the DiD specifications (since these have only a single
coefficient of interest, unlike the regressions that allow for a slope change), presented in Figures A6
– A9.
For each outcome, we first perform a permutation test that respects the potential serial corre-
lation in the data, by implementing a standard DiD specification (like in column (1) of the main
results tables) for only ten years of data, five years pre and five years post, with 1994 (or the
corresponding school entry cohort) as the treatment year. We then compare this coefficient to
the coefficient obtained from taking each possible sequential interval of ten years within our study
period, and each corresponding false “treatment” year in the middle of the interval. This test does
not yield a normal distribution of coefficients, as there are a limited number of ten-year intervals
in the study period. Our true effect is larger than the effect of any other treatment year for age at
first marriage and graduate education. For college education only one of the coefficients is larger
(which amounts to approximately 6% of the values). For spousal income, we see higher estimated
changes for two years following our “true” treatment year (1996 and 1997), which corresponds to
the “delayed response” of the marriage market equilibrium (as discussed above and apparent in
figure 12).
We then perform a more standard permutation test, where we randomly draw a number of
years equal to our true number of treated years from the entire study period, and run our baseline
regression with these randomly selected years as the “treatment” period (for an example of this
approach, see Agarwal et al. (2014)). This approach does not respect the underlying serial correla-
tion in the data, since the years are drawn randomly, but does account for intra-group correlation
or other non-standard error structures. We perform 1,000 such random draws, and compare our
true treatment coefficient to the resulting normal distributions. Our true effect is outside of the
curve or in the far right tail, with less than 5% of the values above it, for every outcome measure.
Event Study analysis The next potential confounding factor we explore is that long term time
trends may be responsible for the effects we see. This is already partially addressed by the inclusion
of group-specific time trends in our regressions. However, to further address this possibility, we
perform an event study analysis (also known as dynamic lag analysis), to pinpoint the timing of
the changes we observe. We do this for our main outcome measures: college education, graduate
education, age at first marriage, and spousal income for women who marry when older.
The event study graphs depicted in Figure 13 are created by regressing our key outcome vari-
able on a series of dummies for each year, interacted with gender or age respectively (gender for
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educational outcomes, age-at-marriage for spousal income), and including the same controls as
our regression specifications. Because each year of the entire sample period is allowed to have a
group-specific effect, this is a demanding test. The coefficients graphed represent the effect of each
time period, controlling for all other time periods. The coefficient on the lag just before the policy
change is normalized to zero, so that subsequent effects show the relative difference in the affected
group’s outcomes compared to the period just before the policy change. Note that the time periods
we are looking at are quite small relative to our other graphs, as we are zeroing in on four years
before and six years after the policy change only.
Appendix Figure A10 shows an alternate format of event study, a “distributed lag” analysis,
where coefficients for being born at or above a certain year (rather than in a certain year) are
graphed, controlling for all other years. This, essentially, measures the permanent shock that
occurs in each year to the outcome variables. This alternate analysis confirms the results presented
here.
All event studies show that there are no significant pre trends driving our results, and that
outcomes were relatively flat in the years immediately preceding the policy change. The event
studies for age at first marriage, college education, and graduate education show that results become
significant after the policy change, either immediately or over time. Figure 13, panel (a), shows
that prior to the policy change the difference between men and women’s age at first marriage was
relatively constant, showing no apparent pre-trend. Then, in the year of the policy change, there
is a large and permanent change to subsequent outcomes.
For the education event studies, we cannot expect that the impact will necessarily be isolated
to the “first treated” cohort, since preceding cohorts may have been exposed (at least partially).
Indeed, figures 13, panel (b) shows that the change appears to happen more gradually, only be-
coming significant at the end of the period. However, part of the reason for this less significant
outcome is that the 1970 cohort, immediately preceding the first “treated” cohort of 1971, was also
partially treated, as some of these individuals were still young enough to alter their college-going
plans. This is confirmed by the distributed lags analysis in Figure A10, panel (b) where both the
1970 and the 1971 cohorts (years -1 and 0) appear to experience a permanent positive shock of
approximately equal magnitude.
Figure 13, panel (c), shows that, in the case of graduate education, the effect is more clearly
isolated in the “first treated” cohort, the 1966 birth cohort, remaining permanently high after that
point.
Figure 13, panel (d), shows an event study analysis of the change in spousal income for women
who marry older versus younger. This graph shows no significant effect in the period following the
policy change, although it does also affirm there do not appear to be significant pre-trends prior
to 1994. The weaker results in this event study may be due to men’s beliefs about the fertility
of older partners taking longer to update, as well as the shifting of the marriage market to a new
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Figure 13: Event Study Analysis
(a) Age at First Marriage (b) College Education
(c) Graduate Education (d) Spousal Income
Notes: The figures present dynamic lag event study analyses for the principal regression specifications for our main
outcome variables. Point estimates and confidence intervals are for the coefficients on yearly dummy variables
interacted with dummy variables for the treated group. For age at first marriage, college education, and graduate
education, the treated group is women, compared to men, while for spousal income it is women over 30 at first
marriage, compared to those under 30. For age at first marriage and spousal income, time is year of marriage, with
1994 as time “zero,” while it is birth cohort for college and graduate education. The regression equation includes all
year-group interactions for the entire sample period, as well as a linear time trend and demographic controls. All
regressions restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
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equilibrium taking time.
Censoring or other data issues A different possibility is that the effect we observe is an artifact
created by looking at outcomes retrospectively in cross-sectional data. We already minimize this
concern as we carefully choose the years and cohorts which constitute the sample for each outcome,
and re-examined our educational outcomes in repeated data, finding similar effects. However, to
further verify that the retrospective nature of the analysis could not create similar breaks in the
data without a real policy effect, we use the 1995 Israeli Population Census to conduct a placebo
test. We replicate our analysis for a fake “policy change” in 1981 (14 years prior to the Census
year, as the real 1994 policy change is 14 years before the 2008 Census) and find no evidence of a
break in age at first marriage, college education, graduate education, or spousal income (age at first
marriage, if anything, shifts in the opposite direction), as shown in Appendix Figure A11. There
are no similar shifts in any of the outcomes in the 1995 Census as in our results using the true
policy change.
A more specific concern in this context is the possibility that men’s educational outcomes were
more censored than women’s outcomes as we look at years closer to the present day, since men are
entering and completing college education later than women. It should be noted that we already
presented one method which satisfyingly deals with this obstacle; in Appendix Table A1, we show
that our results for college education hold when we define gradual exposure to treatment and allow
men and women to differ in their level of exposure, according to the actual distribution of each
group’s age at college entry. Next, we further explore the robustness of our findings to this difference,
by shifting data for men one year, to account for the average one year lag in male applicants’ age
compared to female applicants (this lag likely results from the extra year of mandated military
service for men). As a result of this shift, men and women are aligned by college entry cohort,
rather than by birth year. Appendix Table A4 shows these results, for both college and graduate
education. The effects are slightly smaller in magnitude when accounting for this lag, yet there is
still a significant increase in women’s education after the policy change for all specifications.
Global shock After establishing that the break we observe is genuine, significant, and timed at
the year of the policy change, we turn to explore the possibility that we have misattributed the
source of this dramatic change. To verify that broader international trends during the nineties
are not responsible for our effects, we conduct placebo tests in the United States as well as four
other OECD countries with GDP per capita similar to Israel, and Census data availability: Greece,
Spain, France, and Portugal. Results for college education in the four “comparable” countries are
shown in Appendix Figure A12. The United States American Community Survey also contains
information on marriage age, which allows us to look at both educational and marriage outcomes,
shown in Figure 14. None of these placebo tests produce positive, significant results, indicating
49
Figure 14: United States College Attainment and Age at Marriage
(a) Age at First Marriage (b) College Attainment
Notes: Placebo test for global 1994 shift. Figure (a) shows the difference between age at first marriage for women
and men, with fitted lines for the “pre” and “post” periods. Figure (b) shows the difference in college attainment
between women and men, with the “treatment” year adjusted to reflect the cohort entering college in 1994 in the US,
as well as a dotted line at the 1971 cohort (to visually check for a shock based on both birth year and college-entry
year). Data from the 2010 American Community Survey.
there was no broader global shock affecting those entering college in 1994.
Other health expansions Another possible explanation to the observed changes in women’s
outcomes could be the general change in health services provided by the NHI law. Although
improved health services could have some effect on education (due to an increase in life expectancy
for instance) or on marital outcomes (if we believe that age serves as a proxy for spousal health
in general, rather than just fertility), it seems less likely to explain the gender differential change
that we identify. Moreover, only a very dramatic change in access to health services would have
an impact on either life expectancy or age related health perceptions. In practice, only 5% of the
population had no health insurance prior to the reform. The remaining 95% were covered by one
of the four HMOs, and experienced a very moderate change in coverage, except for very specific
services such as IVF.52 It should also be noted that during 1994, before the reform was actually
executed, many people thought that it was bound to increase the cost of health care, and decrease
the quality of the services.53 Due to the complexity of the reform, mainly aimed at changing the
institutional structure of the health system in Israel, the uncertainty over the actual results of the
52Additional significant changes were made in coverage of learning disabilities treatment and psychotherapy, as
well as in tests for early detection of cancer.
53The slogan of the anti-reform campaign was “pay more, get less”, see Yedioth Ahronoth, December 15, 1994.
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reform continued for decades, and even nowadays these consequences are being debated.54
Nonetheless, to check that our results are not driven by previously uninsured women accessing
additional health services, we repeat our main analysis excluding the groups who were most likely
to have no insurance before the NHI law. The previously uninsured population consisted mostly of
very poor households, immigrants, elderly individuals, and Arab-Israelis living in remote areas.55
Since the three latter groups are already excluded from our main sample, we proceed by excluding
the bottom quartile socio-economic groups, based on the geographic area of residence.56 Appendix
Table A5 reports the results of this estimation for our four main outcomes, using the main specifi-
cation including fixed effects. The estimates for the main coefficients of interest remain essentially
unchanged, suggesting that the effect we document was not unique nor especially dominant for the
previously uninsured population.
Higher-education reform Finally, we consider the higher education reform in Israel, which
materialized throughout the eighties and nineties, as an alternative explanation. Prior to the
reform only universities could grant academic degrees. Starting in the seventies, colleges gradually
began to receive permission to grant academic degrees equivalent to the ones given by universities.
It is important to note that this reform was gradual, and thus is already partially ruled out as
an alternative explanation by the discontinuous nature of the change in age-at-first marriage, as
well as the event study analysis. This process accelerated during the eighties and early nineties,
culminating in an official and comprehensive plan for the development of academic colleges. In
the decade between 1992 and 2002 the number of students in academic programs approximately
doubled (the effect of the reform was already apparent in the early nineties, but really started
to build up in 1997-1998 (Volanski, 2005; Bernstein, 2002)). We already discussed the potential
impact of the reform in Section 4.2, where we repeated our main analysis using Arab women as
a control group to address the concern that this reform, or any other policy event, drives the
gender differential change in higher-education completion. Arab-Israelis were much more likely
than Jewish-Israelis to be affected by the higher-education reform, because it increased access to
higher education for individuals with relatively low high-school achievements (Volanski, 2005), and
for populations in peripheral areas. On the other hand, Arab women are not expected to react to
the introduction of IVF, mostly due to significant religious constraints on usage (this is discussed
further in Section 4.2). Hence, the fact that Jewish women, starting at 1994, divert to a higher
and increasing educational trend in comparison to both Jewish-men and Arab-women, cannot be
54See for example reports issued by the Ministry of Health: “20 Years to the NHI Law” (May 2015) “Light and
Shadow in the evolvement of the NHI Law” (February 2010).
55See for example: the Netanyahu Commission report, “State Commission for Investigation of Functioning and
Efficiency of the Health Care System in Israel,” 1990; NHI law proposal, June 1993; “NHI Law: Equality, Efficiency,
and Cost,” report issued by Adva center, 1996.
56We use the smallest geographic unit available, “statistical area” which usually has 3-5 thousand residents. There
is a standard classification of these areas to 20 socio-economic groups. We drop the bottom five.
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explained by the higher-education reform.
In addition, the two different reforms were likely to have affected different socioeconomic groups:
IVF access is expected to have the largest impact for women interested in pursuing graduate
education and demanding careers, while the education reform was targeted at those who did not
currently have access to higher education. At the time of the education reform, women already
constituted more than 50% of undergraduate students. The main purpose of the reform was to
make higher education institutions more accessible to a lower socioeconomic status population,
mostly concentrated in peripheral regions (Volanski, 2005; Shavit, Arum and Gamoran, 2007), and
increase higher education supply to match the rapidly increasing demand.57 Numerous studies
were conducted to document the reform’s consequences, none of which report a distinctive effect on
women’s participation in higher education (see for example Volanski (2005)). In fact, the percentage
of female students in colleges (the previously “non-academic” institutions) was actually lower than
in universities.58
Moreover, similar reforms in other countries were not found to affect women differently than
men. One example is the higher education reform in Spain, which was enacted at approximately the
same years as in Israel, and did not change the trend of women’s education or of women’s marriage
decisions (Mora, 1996). It should also be noted that there is no reason to expect the reform to
affect the way women’s marriage outcomes depend on their age. We find that the previously
existing penalty for older marriage practically disappears, even if we control for women’s level of
education. Combined together, it is hard to imagine that the driving force for all of the above
described impacts is the increased supply of higher education rather than the increased availability
of IVF technology, as we suggest.
To confirm this empirically, we conduct two additional tests to rule out this alternative expla-
nation to our findings. To verify that our results are not due to an “in name only” change in the
degree individuals received, we graph the percentage of any post secondary education graduates,
which will include those whose degree status would have been switched into the academic “college”
category after the reform. Appendix Figure A13 shows that even if we add non-academic degrees
to our analysis, we get the same trends and the same change in trend only for women. This,
together with our strong results for graduate education, eases our concerns for higher education
reform driving the results by re-labeling once non-academic degrees.
Finally, to directly rule out this alternative explanation, in Appendix Table A6 we implement
regressions controlling for a gender-specific impact of expanded educational access. We include
controls for the number of academic colleges and teacher-training colleges by year,59 interacted
57The demand increase stems from the growing rate of high-school graduates that received certificates in matricu-
lation exams (which are needed when applying for college) (Shavit, Arum and Gamoran, 2007).
58The only exception is teacher’s training colleges, where there is a vast majority of female students, however the
academization process for those colleges took place in the early eighties. In addition, the students in these institutions
constitute only a small share of the number of college students overall.
59Although the number of student slots varies by college, controlling for the number of students would be endoge-
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with gender, allowing the additional educational access to have a differential effect for men versus
women. Even with these additional controls allowing for a direct impact of the educational reform,
the break at 1994 is still significant for all outcomes.
5 Conclusion
Increased access to in vitro fertilization offers women the security of a second-line option in case
they do not naturally achieve their desired level of fertility. Like any insurance, this guaranteed
access to IVF may influence individual behavior: In this case, women delay starting families, using
the time to pursue additional education and potentially other career opportunities. The delay in
starting families is shown by the stark increase in age at first marriage for women following the
policy change. The productive use of this time is demonstrated by the rise in completion of college
and graduate education, and subsequently improved career outcomes.
The policy change may also have impacted men’s beliefs about older women’s value as partners.
We show evidence that older women marry higher quality partners after the policy. This shift in
the marriage equilibrium may further reflect in women’s decisions—knowing they will not lose as
much “reproductive capital” by delaying marriage, and that their later-life marriage opportunities
will be more favorable as a result, they will have fewer impediments to pursuing desired educational
or career investments.
By testing what happens when the threat of later life infertility is attenuated, this research
suggests time-limited fecundity as a key source of asymmetry between men and women. When
better insured against later life infertility, women delay marriage, invest in more education, have
better career outcomes, and marry higher quality partners despite the delay. In the absence of
such insurance, this female-specific sharp decline in fertility may contribute to lower human capital
investments by women during their reproductive years, and consequently the gender wage gap. In
Israel, changing fertility horizons appears to substantially impact college and graduate education,
both because women start families quite young and have relatively high desired fertility rates,
and because obligatory military service already delays any decision women make by at least two
years. In other OECD countries, however, this investment tradeoff may take place after women
have completed their education, when further on-the-job investments are required in order to climb
the corporate ladder: late nights at the law firm, medical residencies, or the tenure sprint. Thus,
depreciating reproductive capital may help to explain the lack of women in higher-level management
positions as well as the high-skill gender wage gap. A wide range of policies, such as increased
support for child-rearing in two-career households and access to maternity leave and career re-
entry, in addition to access to assisted reproduction technologies, could help alleviate this tradeoff.
In regard to the specific Israeli policy we evaluate, our findings demonstrate that the beneficiary
nous, and thus the number of institutions provides a better measure of the exogenous change.
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population extends far beyond the women who actually use IVF or other assisted reproduction
technologies. Rather, because the guaranteed access acts as insurance in case natural conception
fails, all women considering further educational investments or delayed marriage may benefit. This
is of critical importance because the cost per user of free IVF with Israel’s generous coverage is
enormous, and Israel is currently considering measures to limit the policy, having already placed
age limits on use, and restricted the number of cycles for certain women. When taking into account
the “insurance effect” of the policy, the potential benefits to be weighed against those costs expand
considerably.
One slight caution in regards to this cost-benefit calculation is that the type of benefits we
describe may not be what the Israeli government had in mind when they enacted the policy.
The objectives of the policy were not to increase women’s education and career outcomes, but
were rather explicitly pro-natalist, aimed at increasing the birth rate of Israeli citizens.60 Thus,
policymakers should note that the behavioral response to IVF access may cause fertility effects to
be attenuated, or even go in the opposite direction. If women do delay starting families, assured
against the outcome of having zero children, they may nonetheless end up with a smaller overall
family size, due to the late start. Moreover, since some evidence suggests individuals are overly
optimistic about IVF’s success rates, some women may delay and go on to use the technology, only
to be unsuccessful conceiving.
The question of the tradeoff between further human capital investments and labor market pro-
ductivity versus satisfaction derived from family and home life extend beyond Israeli policymaking.
As more and more US companies consider measures such as paying for employees to freeze eggs,
which similarly creates insurance against later life infertility, some women who are already planning
to delay childbearing may be relieved by the benefit, while others could see a constantly moving
finish line for how long they are expected to delay, and feel pressured to submit themselves to
intrusive medical procedures and late parenthood. Thus, it is unclear if expanded access to IVF
is the best policy to alleviate the one-sided burden of depreciating reproductive capital. What is
clear, however, is that this burden plays a crucial role in women’s decisions and outcomes.
60The policy was defended in courts and described as a part of the fundamental human right to give birth and
build a biological family.
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6 Appendix
Figure A1: Difference in Education Rates with Fuzzy Treatment
(a) College Education (b) Graduate Education
Notes: These graphs show that the difference in education outcomes post-policy is still apparent with a two-year
interval on either side of our “most treated” cohort. Older cohorts may have been partially treated, if some individuals
had not yet made their educational decisions and thus were able to respond to the policy change, and younger cohorts
may not have been fully treated, if some individuals had made their educational decisions already. Data from the
2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
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Table A1: College Education by Percent of Cohort Treated
Dependent variable: College Education Gradual Exposure
DiD GLS DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fem × treated 0.090 0.051 0.090 0.055
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗
[0.026]∗∗∗ [0.032]
cohort treated -0.029 0.016 -0.036 0.002
(0.022) (0.019) (0.032) (0.030)
[0.041] [0.038]
female 0.021 0.047 0.021 0.044
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
[0.021] [0.025]∗
fem × time 0.002 0.002
(0.000)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗
[0.001]∗
Constant 0.385 0.392 0.252 0.258
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
[0.024]∗∗∗ [0.024]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES YES YES
Observations 173790 173790 54 54
R-Squared 0.109 0.109
Notes: The treatment variable is a continuous variable that measures the gender-specific percent of the cohort that has yet to
enter college in 1994, and hence has the potential to alter decisions due to the policy change that occurred at the same year.
The percentages are based on data from the 1995 Israeli Census regarding the age distribution of 1993 college entrants. We
use 1993 because it is the last pre-treatment year and thus the best measure for the college-entry age distribution both for the
pre-treatment years and for 1994 in the absence of treatment (i.e. the policy change). Columns 1–2: Ordinary least-squares
difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard
errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the gender × geography level
in square brackets. Columns 3–4: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the gender-year-of-birth level.
Robust standard errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique
autocorrelation parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-
born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A2: High School Placebo
(a) 1971 Cutoff (b) 1978 Cutoff
Notes: We test for a change in high school completion rates to rule out broader increases in education driving
our effects for both the 1971 cohort, which would have been affected if the shock was something that impacted all
individuals born in 1971, and the 1978 cohort, which would have been affected if the shock impacted all individuals
pursuing schooling in 1994. Figure (a) shows average high school completion for women and men by birth cohort.
Figure (b) presents the difference in high school completion between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the
pre and post periods. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
Figure A3: Female vs. Male Highschool Matriculation (“Bagrut”)
(a) Jewish Students (b) Arab Students
Notes: The figures show the number of high-school students passing the matriculation exams (“Bagrut”) by birth
year, for men and women separately. In addition, the ratio of women to men passing the exams is calculated and
measured on the right hand side y-axis. Figure (a) presents these figures for students in Hebrew speaking schools,
i.e., the Jewish population of Israel. Figure (b) shows the same figures for students in Arabic schools, i.e., the Arab
population of Israel. Birth years are calculated by subtracting 18 (the approximate age for students in the last year
of high-school) from the year of exam. Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics year-books for the years
1989-2002.
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Table A2: Age at First Marriage (Arab Control)
Dependent variable: Age First Marriage
DiD Slope-Change DiD GLS Slope-Change DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
jewish × post 1.019 1.016 -0.076 -0.057 -0.033 0.488
(0.127)∗∗∗ (0.106)∗∗∗ (0.152) (0.082) (0.150) (0.325)
[0.208]∗∗∗ [0.208]∗∗∗ [0.192] [0.192]
jewish × post × time 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.349
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.062)∗∗∗
[0.030]∗ [0.030]∗
Constant 21.984 20.049 21.688 21.626 21.692 20.172
(0.084)∗∗∗ (0.135)∗∗∗ (0.036)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.116)∗∗∗ (0.506)∗∗∗
[0.269]∗∗∗ [0.216]∗∗∗ [0.334]∗∗∗ [0.355]∗∗∗
YOM FEs YES YES YES
Observations 124744 124744 124744 124744 62 62
R-Squared 0.121 0.122 0.122 0.123
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data (no controls included since
religiosity and parents’ origin controls used only apply to Jewish population). Robust standard errors clustered at the group
× year level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the group × geography level in square brackets. Columns
5–6: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the group-year level. Robust standard errors that allow for
cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation parameter for each
group), in parentheses. All specifications include coefficients for group, post, time, post × time, and group × time. Data from
the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A4: Female vs. Male Income Residuals
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows income levels, controlling for a flexible polynomial in age and a dummy for female, for women
and men by birth cohort. Figure (b) presents the difference in income between women and men, as well as fitted
lines for the pre (1951-1970 birth cohorts) and post (1971-1977 birth cohorts) periods (the choice of cohorts follows
the college education analysis). Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
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Figure A5: Female vs. Male Prestigious Occupations
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows rates of participation in prestigious occupations, including management, law, medicine,
engineering, and academia, for women and men by birth cohort. Figure (b) presents the difference in these rates
between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre (1951-1970 birth cohorts) and post (1971-1977 birth
cohorts) periods (the choice of cohorts follows the college education analysis). Data from the 2008 Israeli population
census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
Figure A6: Permutations for Age at First Marriage
(a) 5-Year Treatment Period (b) 1000 Permutations with Random Treatment
Notes: The figure on the left is created by running a similar regression as our column 1 specification, except with
a ten year data period, with five years control and five years treatment, sequentially, for every possible ten year
period in our data range. The red line represents the effect size of the actual treatment year, with this ten-year
data period (the ten-year approach allows us to compare our actual treatment to other break points, with the same
number of years before and after). The figure at right uses the same number of “treated” years as in the true model,
but randomly draws them from the study period (for an example of this approach, see Agarwal et al. (2014)). We
perform 1,000 such random draws.
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Table A3: Spousal Income, Triple Difference
Dependent variable: Spousal Income, Triple Difference
DDD GLS DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
older × post × fem 17676.189 17250.748 18046.017 17341.056
(8597.305)∗∗ (8155.762)∗∗ (7929.683)∗∗ (8522.156)∗∗
[8490.004]∗∗ [8540.434]∗∗
older × post 1402.961 2216.055 426.693 -369.805
(3793.243) (3913.530) (3185.769) (3386.364)
[2797.701] [2837.764]
older × fem -22896.788 -22941.086 -24944.938 -23669.066
(5939.128)∗∗∗ (6183.988)∗∗∗ (6829.507)∗∗∗ (7471.575)∗∗∗
[13814.507]∗ [13780.157]∗
fem × post -22940.075 -21719.467 -18596.185 -17184.070
(4659.229)∗∗∗ (3876.876)∗∗∗ (7385.162)∗∗ (7832.778)∗∗
[4090.765]∗∗∗ [3962.996]∗∗∗
post 11976.842 6300.597
(4795.629)∗∗ (3028.793)∗∗
[3029.632]∗∗∗
female 120102.904 119306.436 61419.868 59491.186
(2638.721)∗∗∗ (2262.463)∗∗∗ (6510.743)∗∗∗ (7082.276)∗∗∗
[8472.702]∗∗∗ [8328.691]∗∗∗
married older 303.631 -120.452 -3394.571 -3334.257
(2859.065) (2384.070) (2642.969) (2827.988)
[3956.800] [3947.478]
time -737.461 1231.043
(481.807) (227.629)∗∗∗
[431.037]∗
Constant 727786.275 641649.432 -5745.596 -14481.554
(580311.776) (594258.199) (2117.151)∗∗∗ (2436.667)∗∗∗
[453091.957] [456996.909]
YOM FEs YES YES
Observations 45089 45089 72 72
R-Squared 0.183 0.184
Notes: Columns 1–2: Ordinary least-squares triple-difference regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity and
parents’ origin, as well as a flexible polynomial for age. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × age group × year
level in parentheses; robust standard errors clustered at the age gender × group × geography level in square brackets. Columns
3–4: Generalized least squares regression with data collapsed to the gender-age group-year-of-marriage level. Robust standard
errors that allow for cross-sectional correlation and for panel-specific serial correlation (i.e. estimate a unique autocorrelation
parameter for each group), in parentheses. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A7: Permutations for College Education
(a) 5-Year Treatment Period (b) 1000 Permutations with Random Treatment
Notes: The figure on the left is created by running a similar regression as our column 1 specification, except with
a ten year data period, with five years control and five years treatment, sequentially, for every possible ten year
period in our data range. The red line represents the effect size of the actual treatment year, with this ten-year
data period (the ten-year approach allows us to compare our actual treatment to other break points, with the same
number of years before and after). The figure at right uses the same number of “treated” years as in the true model,
but randomly draws them from the study period (for an example of this approach, see Agarwal et al. (2014)). We
perform 1,000 such random draws.
Figure A8: Permutations for Graduate Education
(a) 5-Year Treatment Period (b) 1000 Permutatins with Random Treatment
Notes: The figure on the left is created by running a similar regression as our column 1 specification, except with
a ten year data period, with five years control and five years treatment, sequentially, for every possible ten year
period in our data range. The red line represents the effect size of the actual treatment year, with this ten-year
data period (the ten-year approach allows us to compare our actual treatment to other break points, with the same
number of years before and after). The figure at right uses the same number of “treated” years as in the true model,
but randomly draws them from the study period (for an example of this approach, see Agarwal et al. (2014)). We
perform 1,000 such random draws.
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Figure A9: Permutations for Spousal Income-Age-Residual
(a) 5-Year Treatment Period (b) 1000 Permutations with Random Treatment
Notes: The figure on the left is created by running a similar regression as our column 1 specification, except with
a ten year data period, with five years control and five years treatment, sequentially, for every possible ten year
period in our data range. The red line represents the effect size of the actual treatment year, with this ten-year
data period (the ten-year approach allows us to compare our actual treatment to other break points, with the same
number of years before and after). The figure at right uses the same number of “treated” years as in the true model,
but randomly draws them from the study period (for an example of this approach, see Agarwal et al. (2014)). We
perform 1,000 such random draws.
Table A4: College and Graduate Graduation Rates, Men’s Cohort Adjusted
Dependent variable: College Education Graduate Education
DiD with GSTT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
fem × post 0.024 0.018 0.014 0.009
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗
[0.016] [0.015] [0.008]∗ [0.007]
Constant 0.497 0.396 0.195 0.208
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
[0.031]∗∗∗ [0.023]∗∗∗ [0.016]∗∗∗ [0.015]∗∗∗
YOB FEs YES YES
Cohort FEs YES YES
Observations 171617 171617 136998 136998
R-Squared 0.110 0.110 0.0468 0.0469
Notes: Columns 1–4: Ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for reli-
giosity and parents’ origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × cohort level in parentheses; robust standard errors
clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. All specifications include coefficients for female, post, time, and
group × time. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A10: Event Study Analysis (Distributed lags)
(a) Age at First Marriage (b) College Education
(c) Graduate Education (d) Spousal Income
Notes: The figures present distributed lag event study analyses for the principal regression specifications for our main
outcome variables. Point estimates and confidence intervals are for the coefficients on dummy for being in or greater
than a given year, interacted with dummy variables for the treated group. For age at first marriage, college education,
and graduate education, the treated group is women, compared to men, while for spousal income it is women over 30
at first marriage, compared to those under 30. For age at first marriage and spousal income, time is year of marriage
(being married in or after the given year), with 1994 as time “zero,” while it is birth cohort for college and graduate
education (being born in or after the specified cohort). The regression equation includes all year-group interactions
for the entire sample period, as well as a linear time trend and demographic controls. All regressions restricted to
Israeli-born Jews.
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Figure A11: Placebo Test using 1995 Israeli Census
(a) Age First Marriage (b) College Education
(c) Graduate Education (d) Income-Age-Residual
Notes: Placebo test for spurious results due to retrospective analysis, using 1995 census and fictitious 1981 ”policy
change”. Figure (a) presents the difference in men and women’s age at first marriage by marriage year, figure (b)
presents the difference in men and women’s college attainment and figure (c) graduate attainment by birth year, and
figure (d) presents the difference in spousal income-age-residual for women who marry at 30 or above versus those
who marry younger. Data from 1995 Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews. Note, that for age at
first marriage, we use data up to 1993, to avoid the “post treatment” period (which starts at 1994).
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Figure A12: College Attainment by Birth Cohort in Comparable Countries
(a) Greece (b) Spain
(c) France (d) Portugal
Notes: We use countries that have censuses around the time of Israel’s 2008 Census and similar GDP per capita as
Israel to conduct placebo tests, showing that the cohort entering college in 1994 in other countries was not similarly
affected (in each country, the break-point is shifted according to typical college entry age of students in that country,
while the dotted line highlights the 1971 cohort). This would be the case if broader international shifts in the nineties
were responsible for the effects that we see. We do not observe similar discontinuous increases in female versus male
college attainment over time in any of the other countries. The same lack of discontinuous trends is true when looking
at graduate school attainment as well, although the data is somewhat noisier. Census data for Greece from 2001.
Census data from Spain, France, and Portugal from 2011. Data obtained from IPUMS.
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Table A5: All Outcomes, Excluding Bottom Socio-Economic Status Groups
Dependent variable: AFM College Graduate Sp Inc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
treated × post 0.213 0.004 0.015 17422.184
(0.047)∗∗∗ (0.007) (0.007)∗∗ (6152.163)∗∗∗
[0.143] [0.017] [0.009]∗ [8879.802]∗
treated × post × time 0.049 0.006 0.000
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)
[0.023]∗∗ [0.004]∗ [0.002]
Constant 23.424 0.441 0.221 -514742.422
(0.073)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (871970.673)
[0.187]∗∗∗ [0.029]∗∗∗ [0.019]∗∗∗ [831479.104]
FEs (YOB/YOM) YES YES YES YES
Observations 113652 122001 96788 13212
R-Squared 0.219 0.106 0.0476 0.0545
Notes: These regressions exclude the bottom 5 (of 20) socio-economic groups, in order to rule out that expansion of access
to healthcare could have driven outcome measures. Only 5% of Israelis were uninsured at the time of the 1994 policy change.
All columns present ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity
and parents’ origin and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the group × year level in parentheses (in columns
1–3 group is gender and in column 4 it is age group; in columns 2–3 year is year of birth and in columns 1 and 4 year is year
of marriage); robust standard errors clustered at the group × geography level in square brackets. Columns 1–3 present slope-
change DiD estimates for age at first marriage, college education and graduate education. Column 4 present DiD estimates for
spousal income, controlling for spousal age with a flexible polynomial. All specifications include coefficients for group, post,
and time. College, graduate, and AFM regressions additionally include post × time and group × time. Data from the 2008
Israeli population census, restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A13: Female vs. Male Post-Secondary Education
(a) Separate (b) Difference
Notes: Figure (a) shows average post-secondary educational attainment for women and men by birth cohort. Figure
(b) presents the difference in post-secondary attainment between women and men, as well as fitted lines for the pre
(1951-1970 birth cohorts) and post (1971-1977 birth cohorts) periods. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census,
restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
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Table A6: Main Outcomes, Controlling for the Number of Academic and Teachers’ Colleges
Dependent variable: AFM College Graduate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fem × post 0.376 0.381 0.026 0.026 0.033 0.033
(0.165)∗∗ (0.057)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
[0.174]∗∗ [0.172]∗∗ [0.018] [0.018] [0.011]∗∗∗ [0.011]∗∗∗
fem × post × time 0.051 0.052 0.011 0.011 -0.003 -0.003
(0.020)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗ (0.001)∗∗
[0.034] [0.034] [0.005]∗∗ [0.005]∗∗ [0.003] [0.003]
Constant 26.142 26.360 0.492 0.540 0.260 0.241
(0.174)∗∗∗ (0.106)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
[0.305]∗∗∗ [0.222]∗∗∗ [0.026]∗∗∗ [0.032]∗∗∗ [0.018]∗∗∗ [0.019]∗∗∗
FEs (YOB/YOM) YES YES YES
Observations 167416 167416 173790 173790 138953 138953
R-Squared 0.246 0.247 0.109 0.109 0.0465 0.0466
Notes: These regressions allow the expansion of the higher-education system to have differential effects for women versus
men, by including gender-specific controls for the number of academic colleges and teachers’ colleges each year. All columns
present ordinary least-squares difference-in-differences regression using micro data, including controls for religiosity and parents’
origin. Robust standard errors clustered at the gender × year level in parentheses (in columns 1–2 year is year-of-marriage
and in columns 3–6, year-of-birth); robust standard errors clustered at the gender × geography level in square brackets. All
specifications include coefficients for female, post, time, post × time, and group × time, in addition to controls for the number
of academic colleges and teachers’ colleges by year, interacted with gender. Data from the 2008 Israeli population census,
restricted to Israeli-born Jews.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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